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ARTICLES
Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform
Hasn't Worked
NICHOLAS BAGLEY*
Notwithstanding its obvious importance, Medicare is almost invisible in the
legal literature. Part of the reason is that administrative law scholars typically
train their attention on the sources of external control over agencies' exercise of
the vast discretion that Congress so often delegates to them. Medicare's adminis-
trators, however wield considerably less policy discretion than the agencies
that feature prominently in the legal commentary. Traditional administrative
law thus yields slim insight into Medicare's operation.
But questions about external control do not-or at least they should not-
exhaust the field. An old and often disregarded tradition in administrative law
focuses not on external constraints, but on the internal control measures that
agencies employ to shape the behavior of the bureaucrats who implement
government programs on the ground. A robust set of internal controls is
necessary whenever central administrators seek to align the actions of line
officers with programmatic goals. And they are all the more necessary when, as
is so often the case in the modern administrative state, implementation authority
is vested in private actors, not government officers.
So it is with Medicare, whose street-level bureaucrats are hundreds of
thousands of private physicians with strong professional commitments and no
particular allegiance to governmental priorities. Yet Congress's persistent fail-
ure to address weaknesses in Medicare's administrative structure has stymied a
series of major reform efforts that have sought to make the program's physi-
cians more attentive to the cost and quality of the medical care for which it
pays. This dismal history suggests that crafting an effective internal law for
Medicare will require Congress to refashion the program around private organi-
zations with the capacity, incentives, and legitimacy to align the practice
patterns of private physicians-its bedside bureaucrats-with federal priorities.
Measured against that baseline, the set of Medicare reforms included in the
Affordable Care Act is a disappointment. A more muscular thoughtful, and
sustained effort is needed.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. O 2013, Nicholas Bagley. For
their helpful comments, many thanks to Rachel Barkow, Lisa Bressman, Nathan Cortez, Kristina
Daugirdas, David Fontana, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Jill Horwitz, Nina Mendelson, Julian
Mortenson, Bill Novak, Nicholas Parrillo, Richard Primus, Adam Pritchard, Carl Schneider, Kevin
Stack, David Super, and Chris Walker. The Article also benefited from feedback from the Vanderbilt
Faculty Workshop; the Harvard Health Law, Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics Workshop; and the
Michigan Governance Roundtable.
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INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1965 in the teeth of fierce opposition from the American Medical
Association (AMA), Medicare was designed to cover the medical costs of its
elderly beneficiaries while interfering as little as possible with the practice of
medicine. So concerned was Congress with limiting federal power that it
prohibited Medicare from "exercis[ing] any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine, [or] the manner in which medical services are provided."'
Nearly five decades later, however, Medicare's chief administrator could
testify before Congress without fear of contradiction that one of Medicare's
"major, overarching goals" is "reducing costs by improving care."2 And indeed,
Medicare's history is littered with the acronyms of reforms designed to achieve
that goal: PSROs (renamed PROs, now QIOs), DRGs, RB-RVSs, the VAP (now
the SGR), and M+C (now MA). Each of these reforms has aimed to encourage
cost-conscious, high-quality care-in other words, to control the practice of
medicine. And, to varying degrees, each has failed. Runaway spending and
shoddy medical care continue to plague Medicare. Now, after health-care
reform, we have a new batch of Medicare reforms and a new set of acronyms:
IPAB, CMI, PCORI, and ACOs. The future does not bode well for these either.
Explanations for Medicare's lackluster performance when it comes to cost
and quality are commonplace. Congress is loath to curb payments to powerful
hospital and physician groups. Warring partisan ideologies on charged health-
care issues bedevil political reform. Cultural infatuation with medical technol-
ogy and antipathy toward rationing spur the rapid adoption of expensive new
treatments, even those of uncertain value. And Medicare's popularity makes the
public, especially politically active elderly citizens, resistant to reform.
But part of the problem is also Medicare's institutional design. Here's the
crux of the dilemma. Only physicians have the opportunity, knowledge, and
legitimacy to make clinically sensitive judgments about what medical care
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1801, 79 Stat. 291
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)) [hereinafter 1965 Medicare Act] .
2. Strengthening Medicare and Medicaid: Taking Steps To Modernize America's Health Care
System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 36-37 (2010) [hereinafter Berwick
Statement] (statement of Dr. Donald Berwick, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human Services).
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beneficiaries need and, by extension, what Medicare should finance. And so
Congress, in the Medicare statute, put physicians at the center of the program.
They judge whether treatments are medically necessary and thus eligible for
reimbursement. They must certify the need for institutional care or Medicare
pays nothing to hospitals, hospices, and skilled nursing facilities.4 And they
diagnose the medical conditions that establish how much Medicare pays for
institutional care.s Physicians are Medicare's bureaucrats at the bedside. Taken
together, their decisions constitute Medicare policy.6
A government program's success depends on its ability to align the behavior
of the frontline bureaucrats that actually implement the program with governmen-
tal priorities. Yet in 1965 Congress crippled Medicare's ability to exert control
over its physician-bureaucrats. At every point, Congress instead indulged the
assumption that physician behavior, driven by a professional commitment to
supplying medical care without regard to financial considerations, would more
or less align with Congress's goals for the program. Any modest misalignment
was worth the price of avoiding government meddling in medical practice.
However understandable at the time, Congress's design choice has hamstrung
subsequent efforts to assert control over the physicians that actually have the
administration of the program in hand. Partly as a result, Medicare outlays have
grown at a blistering pace over its forty-eight year history. The United States
cannot borrow indefinitely to cover these escalating costs, yet there appears to
be little willingness to accept higher tax burdens to pay for them. In any event,
the implied tax increases necessary to finance Medicare much beyond 2020 are,
as Joseph Newhouse puts it, "simply not plausible."8 The picture is similarly
grim on the quality side: avoidable hospital errors appear to contribute to the
deaths of an estimated fifteen thousand Medicare beneficiaries each month.9
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV) (conditioning payment on physician certifica-
tion that, "in the case of medical and other health services, ... such services are or were medically
required").
4. See id. § 1395f(a)(3) (making payment for "inpatient hospital services" available only if "a
physician certifies that such services are required to be given on an inpatient basis for such individual's
medical treatment"); id. § 1395f(a)(7) (same for hospice); id. § 1395f(a)(2)(B) (same for skilled nursing
facilities).
5. See id. § 1395ww(d)(4) (establishing a payment system for inpatient hospital care based on
"diagnosis-related groups").
6. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY- DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES
13, 16-18 (2d ed. 2010) ("[W]hen taken in concert, [street-level bureaucrats'] individual actions add up
to agency behavior."); K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 3
(1930) ("This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the business of law. And
the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or
lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself").
7. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS (1983)
(exploring how the Social Security Administration controls its disability examiners).
8. Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform's Impact on Four Key Groups of Americans, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1720 (2010).
9. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-09-00090, ADVERSE
EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at ii (2010), available at
522 [Vol. 101:519
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Something has to give. Bracket first-order questions about the wisdom of
governmental intervention in medicine, the palatability of reform, or the possibil-
ity that a single payer, even one as large as Medicare, can alone cure what ails
the nation's health-care system. The blunt fact is that, before long, Congress
will have no choice but to confront Medicare's mounting costs. Yet the modem
debate over Medicare reform, as Theodore Marmor laments in his iconic book
on Medicare, has given short shrift to "Medicare's programmatic operation."o
Administrative law scholars, in particular, have paid scant attention to Medi-
care's central accountability question: what tools do administrators have, and
what tools should they have, to encourage Medicare's physicians-its bedside
bureaucrats-to practice inexpensive and high-quality care? Only by crafting an
institutional structure that allows for the assertion of greater control over
physicians can Medicare reduce cost growth to a sustainable level" and im-
prove quality of care, particularly for the majority of Medicare patients that
suffer from chronic conditions. 1 2
Indeed, Medicare is almost invisible in administrative law, perhaps because
most modem commentary is consumed with questions relating to the external
control of agency discretion: political and judicial oversight, separation-of-
powers dynamics, and private influence on agency behavior.1 3 An external
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oeilreportsloei-06-09-00090.pdf; see also INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999) (estimating that as many as 98,000 people die each year as
the result of medical errors); David C. Classen et al., 'Global Trigger Tool' Shows that Adverse Events
in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 584 (2011)
(finding that "adverse events occurred in 33.2 percent of hospital admissions").
10. THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 185-86 (2d ed. 2000).
11. On average, the rate of annual Medicare inflation has exceeded GDP growth by 2.5%. See
Katherine Baicker & Michael E. Chernew, The Economics of Financing Medicare, NEw ENG. J. MED.,
July 28, 2011, at e7(1). Whatever the optimal level of cost growth is-one that modestly exceeds GDP
growth is probably appropriate-the current rate is plainly unsustainable. See Newhouse, supra note 8.
12. In most markets, quality improvements are costly. That's not always, or even usually, true in
medicine. Powerful evidence suggests that a prodigious fraction of medical spending goes toward care
that does not improve patient outcomes. See JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE: A RESEARCHER'S
QUEST To UNDERSTAND HEALTH CARE 156-69 (2010). Greater health-care spending is in fact associated
with, and may contribute to, lower quality care. See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare
Spending, the Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries' Quality of Care, 7 HEALTH ALF. 184 (2004).
Although difficult tradeoffs between cost and quality do arise, the phenomenon of rampant overtreat-
ment suggests that efforts to reduce costs by improving quality will not invariably work at cross-
purposes.
13. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119
YALE L.J. 1362, 1470 (2010) ("Forgetting that administrative law both constitutes and empowers
administrative action at the same time that it structures and constrains administrative behavior,
administrative law is often thought of as just that set of external constraints that limit agency
discretion."). Timothy Jost's 1991 article on Medicare's governance is one of the few efforts to study
Medicare through the lens of administrative law-and, in describing how Congress, the President, and
the courts oversee the program, it is emblematic of this external approach. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 39, 41 (1999). David Frankford, Eleanor Kinney, and, more
recently, Jacqueline Fox have also examined discrete features of Medicare, although none have
grappled with Medicare's regulatory structure as a whole. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, The Medicare
DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (1993); Eleanor D. Kinney,
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
perspective on Medicare has sharp limitations, however. Although many regula-
tory agencies exercise vast policy discretion, Medicare does not. Congress is
intensely interested in even the minutest details of a program that lavishes vast
sums of money on politically important groups in every state and district.
Congress's tight control over Medicare drains the concerns that motivate an
external approach to administrative law of much of their urgency.
But administrative law is-or should be-about more than just the external
control of agency discretion. Rather, as Jerry Mashaw has urged, "[t]he task of
administrative law is to generate institutional designs that appropriately balance
the simultaneous demands of political responsiveness, efficient administration,
and respect for legal rights."14 Systematic accounts of how Medicare's legal
structure enables and (more often) frustrates control over the physicians that
administer the program are nonetheless scarce.15 In offering such an account, I
hope to usher Medicare into administrative law and to build on an old and often
disregarded tradition of investigating what Bruce Wyman in 1903 called "the
science of common action."16
Yet where Wyman understood "internal" administrative law to concern itself
with the relationship between dispersed line officers and the central administra-
tion, the present-day dominance of arrangements in which the government
enlists private actors to implement public programs requires a different empha-
sis. Internal administrative law must account for control not only of government
officials, but of government's private agents. In this, an internal approach
dovetails with the recent emphasis in administrative law on the contracting out
or privatization of governmental functions.17 There, the central preoccupation is
the dearth of governmental capacity to assure that the private actors who
implement public programs remain faithful to democratic values.18 Related
National Coverage Policy Under the Medicare Program: Problems and Proposals for Change, 32 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 869 (1988); Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal
Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BuFF. L. REV. 577 (2005).
14. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263-64 (2006).
15. David Hyman has gleefully cataloged various flaws in Medicare's design. See DAVID A. HYMAN,
MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006). And Sallyanne Payton, in a short but vivid piece, grabs hold
of two of Medicare's major structural defects: its reliance on fee-for-service payments and the weakness
of Medicare's central administration. See Sallyanne Payton, Professionalism as Third-Party Gover-
nance: The Function and Dysfunction of Medicare, in MAKING GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE 112 (Thomas
H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds., 2004).
16. BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS 15 (1903); see also FRANK J. GOODNow, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 371 (1905) ("Some method of control must be devised by which harmony and
uniformity of administrative action and administrative efficiency may be secured .... ).
17. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman &
Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543 (2000); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALF. L. REV. 393
(2008).
18. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 2 (describing
524 [Vol. 101:519
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scholarship in political science and public administration, led by Lester Sala-
mon and sometimes going under the moniker of "new governance," has sounded
similar alarms about management weaknesses in a regulatory landscape charac-
terized by third-party implementation of government programs. 19 Yet for all the
talk of privatization, contracting out, and third-party governance, traditional
Medicare-the single largest public-private partnership in the country-rarely
rates more than a passing mention.2 0
That's a shame. The tools that administrative law scholars have developed in
the outsourcing context can teach us a great deal about Medicare. As Part I
explains, they shed light on how the design choices that Congress made in 1965
have frustrated Medicare's ability to shape the practice patterns of private
physicians. That in turn helps explain why reform efforts have so consistently
foundered. Part II explores Congress's numerous attempts over Medicare's
forty-eight year history to reduce cost growth and improve quality. Each of
Medicare's major reforms has responded to the challenge of asserting control
over physicians by attempting to enlist private actors to oversee how private
physicians practice medicine. And each reform has run aground of Medicare's
flawed institutional structure.
Drawing on this sorry history allows for a richer understanding of what
Medicare must do in order to get a handle on cost escalation and poor quality
care. Part III argues that the pattern of past failure points to a singular conclu-
sion: that Congress must reshape Medicare to encourage the development of
organized health-care systems with the incentives, bureaucratic wherewithal,
and legitimacy to adjust physician practice patterns. Features of Medicare's
organizational structure that impede the development of such organizations
must be swept away or sidestepped. Measured against this baseline, as Part IV
argues, the set of Medicare reforms included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
is a disappointment. 2 1 Although promising on paper and much touted in the
health-policy literature, the ACA's reforms are not well-crafted to stimulate the
development of health-care organizations that can actually shift how physicians
practice medicine. A more muscular, thoughtful, and sustained effort is needed.
"[t]he primary concern ... that the ubiquity of governance-by-private-contractors strikingly outstrips
our legal and political capacities of oversight meant to ensure that the contractors' execution of these
governmental functions complies with democratic norms").
19. See generally THE TOOLS OF GOvERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE 603-05 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002).
20. For a rare and recent take on "delegated governance" in Medicare Part D, see KIMBERLY J.
MORGAN & ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, THE DELEGATED WELFARE STATE: MEDICARE, MARKETS, AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY 144-67 (2011).
21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [herein-
after "ACA"], amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 [hereinafter Reconciliation Act].
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I. MEDICARE'S DESIGN
The original Medicare statute contained evident markers of the strategic
choice to appease the medical establishment. Wilbur Cohen, Medicare's chief
architect, later explained that "[t]he sponsors of Medicare, including myself,
had to concede in 1965 that there would be no real controls over hospitals and
physicians. I was required to promise ... that the Federal agency would exer-
cise no control."2 2 Effectuating that promise required making four design
choices-all of which remain part of Medicare's programmatic architecture-
that would preclude the federal government then, and into the future, from
asserting authority over the physicians that implement Medicare at the bedside.
A. MEDICAL NECESSITY
Subject to steep deductibles, copayments, and caps on per-beneficiary expen-
ditures, the Medicare program's core was (and remains) a commitment to
reimburse hospitals and physicians for the costs of providing all medically
necessary care. Physicians were paid only if they certified that the "medical and
other health services ... are or were medically required."23 Hospitals and other
medical institutions were paid only if a physician certified that an institutional
24setting was medically necessary. Because physicians' prevailing conception of
medical necessity was (and is) cost blind, eligibility for Medicare payments
depended not at all on the costs of the treatment in question. Congress did
exclude from coverage any medical care "not reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury,"25 but the exclusion left treating
physicians nearly untrammeled discretion to determine medical necessity. Con-
gress nowhere intimated that Medicare could refuse to pay for novel treatments
it deemed unreasonable and unnecessary on cost grounds.
B. BORROWING FROM THE BLUES
In addition to linking reimbursement to medical necessity, Congress struc-
tured Medicare to operate along the lines of the indemnity insurance plans then
offered through Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations.2 6 Physicians and
hospitals would have a statutory entitlement to reimbursement from Medicare
akin to their contractual entitlement to reimbursement from the Blues. 2 7 Origi-
nally established by hospitals and doctors to provide a stable source of funding
for medical services, Blue Cross and Blue Shield took a hands-off, no-questions-
asked approach to payment that jibed with Congress's vision of a federal
22. RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S.
HEALTH CARE 17 (2006) (quoting Cohen).
23. See 1965 Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1835(a)(2)(B), 79 Stat. 303.
24. See id. sec. 102(a), § 1814(a)(2).
25. See id. sec. 102(a), § 1862(a)(1).
26. See Payton, supra note 15, at 118-19 (observing that "[t]he Medicare program was designed to
replicate the standard Blue Cross benefit package and the Blue Cross pattern of administration").
27. See 1965 Medicare Act, sec. 102(a), § 1812, 1832.
526 [Vol. 101:519
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program that interfered little in physician practice. What's more, the Blues-
and now Medicare-reimbursed hospitals for their "reasonable cost[s]" 2 8 and
physicians for their "reasonable charges." 2 9 Because the Blues didn't assidu-
ously review claims for payment, hospitals and physicians were in practice
responsible both for dispensing medical services and for gauging the reasonable-
ness of their costs and charges.
Structuring Medicare as an entitlement to indemnification keyed to judg-
ments of medical necessity meant that Congress surrendered direct control over
the size of Medicare funding. Physicians-not Congress in an appropriations
measure-would collectively establish what the government would pay out for
medical services. Because judgments of medical necessity are partly shaped by
physicians' sense of available resources, Medicare's unconstrained willingness
to pay contributed to a loose sense of necessity.
Of equal importance, Medicare borrowed the Blues' practice of paying
hospitals and physicians separately. Hospitals (and other institutional providers)
recovered their reasonable costs under Medicare Part A and physicians recov-
ered their reasonable charges under Part B. This division reflected the structure
of medical practice in 1965. In part because of state laws prohibiting the
corporate practice of medicine, hospitals only rarely employed doctors and were
viewed as little more than physicians' workshops.30 With rare exceptions, no
institutional actor existed that could have accepted Medicare payments and
divvied them up among hospitals and physicians. But by creating separate
payment silos, Congress reinforced the atomistic practice patterns that domi-
nated medical practice in the mid-1960s.
C. DELEGATED ADMINISTRATION
Congress didn't just embrace the indemnity model of the Blues, however. It
actually stitched Blue Cross and Blue Shield into the fabric of Medicare. Instead
of having Medicare process claims itself, as the Social Security Administration
(SSA) did, Congress delegated that responsibility to "fiscal intermediaries" (for
Part A) and "carriers" (for Part B). 3 1 These third-party contractors-mostly
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans-were to carry out the bulk of Medicare's
day-to-day payment responsibilities.
Political exigency led the federal government to parcel out Medicare's regula-
-- 32tory authority to private insurers with close ties to organized medicine. Even
at the time, executive branch officials understood that
28. See id. sec. 102(a), § 1814(b).
29. See id. sec. 102(a), §§ 1832(a)(1), 1833.
30. See PAUL STARR, THE SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 178 (1982).
31. 1965 Medicare Act, sec. 102(a), § 1816 (fiscal intermediaries); id. sec. 102(a), § 1842 (carriers).
32. See Payton, supra note 15, at 126 (observing that the Blues had been "made in the image of the
medical industry").
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[a] considerable price would be paid in order to get the initial public relations
advantages with professional groups that might come from using Blue Cross,
e.g., loss of direct contact with providers so that the Federal Government
would not have detailed knowledge of problems and because of this, the loss
of ability to react quickly to problems of administration, budget, program,
etc. 33
But as Wilbur Cohen explained in an oval office meeting with President
Johnson, that was the point: the Blues "would have to do all the policing so that
the government wouldn't have its long hand [in there]."3
Parceling out Medicare's administrative responsibilities allowed Congress to
run the program with a skeleton crew of federal employees. The bare-bones
staffing of the central agency that oversaw Medicare-which was housed in the
Social Security Administration until a 1977 move to the agency that became the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-was possible only because
federal administrators were not directly responsible for processing claims. Their
role was instead to manage relationships with those outside stakeholders that
actually processed Medicare claims.
D. ANY WILLING PROVIDER
Another tenet of the Blues' model of indemnity insurance was that all
licensed and willing providers would be eligible for reimbursement. The same
tenet applied to Medicare, which imposed no meaningful conditions on participa-
tion other than licensure." In practice, this meant that Medicare ceded the
authority to determine which physicians were eligible to bill Medicare to state
medical societies, which were (and remain) not at all rigorous about policing
their membership.3 6
Once physicians were in, they were hard to kick out. Only if a physician lost
her state license, was "not complying substantially" with Medicare's rules, or
refused to disclose payment-related information could she be excluded from the
program. 7 Nor did administrators have any tools to encourage beneficiaries to
favor certain providers over others. To the contrary, the Medicare statute
guaranteed beneficiaries their "free choice" of hospital or physician. 8
33. SYLViA A. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAr WENT WRONG? 34 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting a 1962 memo from
an executive branch task force) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Larry DeWitt, The Medicare Program as a Capstone to the Great Society-Recent Revelations in
the LBJ White House Tapes (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
35. See sec. 102(a), § 1861(e)(7) (defining "hospital" to mean a state-licensed hospital); id. sec.
102(a), § 1861(r) (defining "physician" to mean a state-licensed physician).
36. Although Medicare was nominally empowered to impose additional participation requirements
on hospitals, Congress circumscribed that power in providing that a hospital is deemed to meet any
such requirements if accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, as most were.
See id. sec. 102(a), §§ 1861(e)(8), 1865. Established by the American Hospital Association, the Joint
Commission had a reputation for catering to the interests of its membership.
37. See id. sec. 102(a), § 1866(b)(2) (emphasis added).
38. See id. sec. 102(a), § 1802.
528 [Vol. 101:519
WHY MEDICARE REFORM HASN'T WORKED
In crafting a program to cover the costs of medically necessary care for the
elderly, Congress delegated immense discretionary authority to the physicians
who would actually deliver that care. This made considerable sense. Only
physicians had the expertise to make reliable judgments of medical necessity
across the full range of medical problems that would confront the elderly. And
because care must be tailored to the demands of each individual case, physi-
cians would need the latitude to dispense covered services based on contextual
and discretionary judgments about patient need. Therefore, physicians were
tasked with making treatment decisions that doubled as adjudicative judgments.
As it effectively deputized each and every doctor in the country as a bedside
adjudicator, however, Congress deprived federal administrators of the conven-
tional roster of legal and management tools typically used to control frontline
bureaucrats. In contrast to the Veterans Administration health-care system,
Medicare wouldn't directly employ its physicians. Administrators thus lacked
direct leverage to encourage cost-conscious, high-quality practice patterns; still
less could they inculcate a culture that rewarded such patterns of care.3 9 Instead,
physicians would operate as independent contractors-but contractors with a
sinecure.
The contracting relationship between the federal government and private
physicians is a loose one, so loose that Medicare is sometimes characterized as
a voucher program: beneficiaries receive a voucher (their Medicare card) that
they can use to secure medically necessary care from private providers that
freely choose whether to accept the vouchers and otherwise have little to do
with the government. 4 0 But the voucher characterization doesn't quite fit.
Vouchers usually have limited purchasing power, giving recipients an incentive
to shop around to find the best deal.4 1 For example, food stamps go further in
cheaper grocery stores. This is not so with traditional Medicare, where beneficia-
ries are insensitive to the costs of care they receive 4 2 and lack much reason to
comparison shop.4 3 Physicians therefore don't compete to offer Medicare ser-
vices at the lowest price. Even more significantly, beneficiaries' "consumption"
choices don't drive most medical decisions as the voucher characterization
39. See generally PHILLIP LONGMAN, BEST CARE ANYWHERE: WHY VA HEALTH CARE Is BETTER THAN
YOURS (2d ed. 2010) (detailing Virginia's relative success at providing low-cost, high-quality care).
40. See Payton, supra note 15, at 119.
41. See C. Eugene Steuerle & Eric C. Twombly, Vouchers, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 445-46 (observing that, in defining a voucher, "the amount of
purchasing power a voucher provides is limited").
42. Although Medicare's entitlement is not open-ended, more than nine out of ten beneficiaries have
some form of supplemental insurance that covers a substantial portion of their deductibles, coinsurance,
and (most importantly) catastrophic expenses. See MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER 5-6
(2006).
43. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 355
(1989) (rejecting characterization of Medicare as a "true [voucher]" program because it "do[es] not
supply the beneficiary with strong incentives to shop around").
2013] 529
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
might suggest. Physician decisions drive them.4 4 (That's also why giving
patients more financial responsibility for medical decision making-or "con-
sumer directed health care"-is unlikely to reduce much cost growth or improve
quality of care. 4 5)
Contract provides the better analogy. In practical effect, Medicare has entered
into separate output contracts with nearly every physician and hospital in the
country.4 6 For whatever medically necessary services physicians choose to
provide to Medicare beneficiaries, the government undertakes to pay for those
services. Conceiving of Medicare as a network of standardized but individual
contracts focuses attention not on beneficiary choices, but on the multitude of
physician-bureaucrats who actually drive most Medicare spending. So under-
stood, Medicare manages private-sector contracts worth more than all of the
federal government's other contracts for goods and services combined.4 7
As a matter of sound administration, this quasi-contractual strategy was
fraught from the outset. John Donahue has rightly emphasized that contracting
works best for "commodity" tasks-those that are specific, easy to evaluate, and
available in a competitive market. 8 The provision of medical care flunks all
three conditions. Unable to specify upfront what it specifically wants from the
physicians that care for the elderly and disabled, Congress must instead contract
out in generic terms for medically necessary care. Lack of scientific consensus
about appropriate medical treatments for all but the most common conditions
makes evaluating quality of care next to impossible. And the market for medical
care is hampered by several well-understood failings, including the absence of
price transparency and consumer uncertainty about the efficacy of treatment
alternatives.
Assuring that the government gets good value for its money when it contracts
for custom services is intrinsically challenging. Cost overruns and quality
44. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 7-8 ("It is physicians who exert the greatest influence over
demand-or really, utilization-because patients traditionally delegate decision making to them under
the assumption that doctors know what is best." (emphasis added)).
45. See Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?,
35 Am. J.L. & MED. 7 (2009) (arguing that health-care consumers lack the choices and information
necessary to demand better health care at a better price).
46. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 347 (8th ed. 2004) (defining output contract as one "in which a
seller [for example, a physician] promises to supply and a buyer [for example, Medicare] to buy all the
goods or services that a seller produces during a specified period and at a set price").
47. Compare Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives It, How
To Improve It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at
192 ("Today, total federal spending on contracts for goods and services of all kinds exceeds $450
billion. ), with 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HoSPrrAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 5 (2010) (reporting that
Medicare dispensed $502 billion in benefits in 2009).
48. See John D. Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and
Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at
41-42.
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concerns, for example, routinely plague efforts to purchase new fighter jets4 9 or
to privatize welfare services.50 But Medicare is an extreme case. Typically,
contract officers have the luxury of selecting discrete suppliers to provide
contracted-for services. Because the number of contracting entities is kept
within manageable bounds, specifying contractual terms and monitoring perfor-
mance, however challenging, is at least remotely feasible.
For Medicare, however, the suppliers of the contracted-for service were, in
2012, more than three-quarters of a million physicians scattered across the
country. 1 Contractual specification at that scale is a practical impossibility for
any agency, particularly one as small as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). And so Medicare takes shortcuts. Instead of soliciting competi-
tive bids, Medicare contracts with all licensed physicians. Instead of dickering
over what it wants to purchase or how much of it, Medicare pays for care that
physicians deem medically necessary. Instead of bargaining over price terms,
Medicare originally allowed physicians to set their own "reasonable charges"
and today pays for services on a fixed fee schedule.52
Because Medicare's standardized quasi-contracts with physicians are so under-
specified, the need for vigorous ex post performance monitoring is all the more
acute. But overseeing the services that hundreds of thousands of physicians
supply to nearly fifty million beneficiaries dwarfs the capacity of CMS-or
indeed any agency. Medicare's structure compounds the difficulty. The private
insurers standing between Medicare and its physicians complicate any quixotic
effort to assiduously monitor physician behavior. And Medicare cannot even
deploy a realistic threat of contract termination in an effort to improve perfor-
mance.
49. See, e.g., Christopher Drew, Costliest Jet, Years in Making, Sees the Enemy: Budget Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/us/in-federal-budget-cutting-f-35-fighter-jet-
is-at-risk.html (reporting on dramatic cost overruns in developing the F-35 fighter jet).
50. See, e.g., David Super, Indiana Court Autopsies Welfare Privatization Effort, BALKINIzATIoN
(Aug. 3, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/08/lindiana-court-autopsies-welfare.html (re-
porting on an Indiana Superior Court decision and documenting "a stunningly incompetent picture of
state officials' design and implementation" of a $1.3 billion, ten-year contract to administer welfare
services).
51. See Total Professionally Active Physicians, November 2012, KAISER FAMILY FoUND., http://www.
statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind= 934&cat= 8 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (estimating that
834,769 physicians are currently active); see also KAISER FAMILY FouND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK 28 (4th
ed. 2010) (reporting that ninety-six percent of active physicians participate in Medicare Part B).
52. Judicial review does not help at all to improve the quality of contracting. Under federal
contracting rules, disgruntled bidders can go to court to protest the selection of someone else for a
government contract. The hope is that protest litigation will prod the government to contract with
high-quality, low-cost suppliers. See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure
of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 627, 640 (2001) (observing that protests "deputize the
private sector, specifically the contractor community, to regulate government behavior"). In Medicare,
however, there are no upset bidders. All licensed physicians can participate. Those injured by inappropri-
ate Medicare expenditures-taxpayers-lack standing to challenge them. See Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923). And judicial review at the behest of providers and beneficiaries serves only to
increase government expenditures, never to reduce them.
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These challenges notwithstanding, Medicare must of necessity marry the
professional commitment of its physicians to programmatic goals that empha-
size cost-effective and high-quality care. In this, the history of Medicare reform
offers a rich look at repeated efforts to orient private actors toward public
goals-what Jody Freeman has aptly termed "publicization."53 And it show-
cases the challenges of managing the multitude of private actors that, in most
cases, actually implement government programs on the ground. 4
II. THE MAJOR REFORMS
The central concern of the contracting literature is the potential threat that the
outsourcing of government functions poses to public values. 5 Outsourcing can
blur lines of accountability, shroud governmental activities in secrecy, and
enable powerful groups to wield untoward influence in the political process. 6
On this account, the ineffective management of government contractors is not
just a technical or budgetary concern, but an urgent democratic problem.
In many respects, Medicare represents the apotheosis of the threat to public
values to which government contracting can give rise. The physicians that
control Medicare expenditures are accountable not to the public at large, but
instead to their professional peer groups. Keeping tabs on how physicians
dispense government benefits is devilishly hard. And Medicare has empowered
a host of powerful interest groups-including the elderly, hospitals, and physi-
cians-that, by exerting their considerable political influence, can swamp more
diffuse public input.
In other respects, however, Medicare complicates the conventional threat-to-
public-values account. For Medicare, the absence of institutional capacity to
manage the private physicians with whom it contracts reflects a deep social
commitment that government should keep out of the examining room. Medicare
thus exploits its institutional weakness to enhance its legitimacy. Distance
between the federal government and the physicians with whom it contracts-a
relative lack of accountability, transparency, and public participation in medical
decisions-is itself a public value.57 Enhancing institutional capacity to shape
53. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1285,
1343 (2003) (arguing that "the inability to specify a [contractual] task because it is value-laden,
politically contentious, and complex" demands strenuous efforts to orient private actors toward public
goals).
54. See Super, supra note 17, at 403 ("Virtually every significant social welfare program is partially
privatized; operating these programs without private entities performing some important roles is
virtually unthinkable in our political culture.").
55. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1259 (2003) ("The urgent question posed by a shifting mix of public and private
providers of education, welfare, and prison services is how to ensure genuine and ongoing accountabil-
ity to the public.").
56. See Freeman & Minow, supra note 18, at 1.
57. See MASHAw, supra note 7, at 32 (noting that, in Medicare, "[t]he professional defines and
legitimates the actions of the agency, rather than the other way round").
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physician practice patterns may respond to some public values (cost and quality
control), but it will conflict with others (physician independence and patient
choice).
Attentive to widespread and understandable concern about government med-
dling in the practice of medicine, in 1965 Congress struck the balance deci-
sively in favor of physician autonomy. Almost immediately, however, the
assumption that physicians could make decisions on Medicare's behalf without
regard to resource constraints came under considerable strain. In response,
Congress has spent the past four decades casting about for strategies to assert
some measure of control over Medicare's physicians without interfering too
much in the practice of medicine. It has, in other words, sought to establish a
palatable and effective internal law for Medicare.
Yet Congress has restricted its own field of choice. As Paul Pierson has
observed, new policy regimes encourage massive investments in skills and
infrastructure, foster dense networks of individuals and organizations dedicated
to the new regimes, and encourage the attitude that the regimes are essential
features of the political landscape. The deeper these commitments, the harder to
shift course, which is the case with Medicare. The basic contours of the
program-public financing, private care-were fixed in 1965. Beneficiaries
grew accustomed to subsidized coverage without meaningful restrictions, and
physicians, hospitals, and other providers committed themselves to the new
world order in which the government would pay the bills but assert no control.
Their substantial investments (financial, social, and psychological) in these
institutional arrangements have limited the range of plausible reform. As such,
the urgent and interesting question is not, as it is in so much of the contracting
literature, whether a privatization strategy for the provision of medical care (the
make-or-buy decision) is normatively attractive. It is instead how to yoke the
immense network of Medicare's private physicians to a broader notion of public
values, one that's more attentive to questions of cost and quality.
Medicare's weakened administrative apparatus has similarly constrained the
choice of reform strategy. Without extraordinary increases in its size and power,
CMS could not even begin to oversee the work of hundreds of thousands of
frontline physicians. Yet resistance to building government runs deep.5 9 Where
the purpose of a government buildup is to shape how physicians practice
medicine, resistance would be far greater still.
In response to these constraints, the methods that Congress has lit on to assert
control over the physicians that administer Medicare share a common attribute:
58. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 251, 259 (2000).
59. See Schooner, supra note 52, at 676-77 (noting "the present political climate of Executive and
Legislative obsession with reducing the size of the Federal workforce").
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they parcel out oversight and management responsibilities to private organiza-
tions. This sort of "indirect" approach to program administration-to use
Salamon's typology-absolves the federal government of direct responsibility
for controlling physicians and, in bypassing agency officials, mutes public
concerns with government interference. 6 0 Turning to private organizations also
allows Congress to leverage organizational resources that are available in the
private sector (or could be pulled together on short order) while at the same
time avoiding the need to increase the power of the federal bureaucracy.
Enlisting private contractors to assert a greater measure of control over other
private contractors is not unique to Medicare.61 The pressures that lead to
government outsourcing in the first place also push for the outsourcing of
oversight functions. In Medicare, however, the practice is unusually entrenched
and pervasive. In this section, I review the four most ambitious efforts to reform
Medicare to date: peer review organizations, prospective payment, Medicare
managed care, and limitations on the coverage of new technology.62 Each of
these reforms sought to vest in private mediating institutions the authority to
reshape the practice patterns of Medicare's physicians. And the myriad failings
of each serve as a stark reminder of one of the most prominent conclusions of
the contracting literature: that policy makers routinely underestimate the manage-
rial challenges posed by third-party governance. 6 3 Perhaps a thorough understand-
ing of their inadequacies can point a way forward.
A. PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS
1. Background
In the wake of a scathing report documenting egregious Medicare fraud, in
1972 Congress called for the creation of regional Professional Standards Re-
view Organizations (PSROs) to oversee the ranks of Medicare's physicians.
With memberships drawn from the ranks of local doctors, PSROs were private
organizations vested with the authority to deny approval for payment of Medi-
care claims, 64 to oversee utilization patterns through statistical data,6 5 and to
60. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1656 (2000).
61. See Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF
GOvERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 523, 540 (cataloging various
examples).
62. Because my focus is on Medicare's design and implementation, I do not discuss several
significant changes in the scope of Medicare benefits, including the 1972 expansion of coverage to the
disabled and those with end-stage renal disease, the 1988 enactment and subsequent repeal of the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, and the 2003 creation of the Part D drug benefit.
63. See Donald F. Kettl, Managing Indirect Government, in THE TOOLS OF GoVERNIETr: A GUIDE TO
THE NEw GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 490-91 ("[P]olicymakers have often shown little interest in
and less knowledge about the management implications of the indirect systems they have created.").
64. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 249F(b), § 1158(a), 86 Stat.
1329, 1437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)) [hereinafter 1972 Amendments].
65. See id. sec. 249F(b), § 1155(a)(4).
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refer individual providers for disciplinary action.6 6 In other words, Congress
enlisted private physicians to watch Medicare's physicians at the bedside.
By any measure, the PSROs were abject failures. Even under optimistic
estimates, the costs of operating PSROs exceeded what they saved. 7 President
Reagan sought to eliminate them when he took office, but Congress resisted
scrapping the program altogether. Influential senators saw PSROs "as the only
logical answer to the question: who should police hospitals and doctors?" 68
Instead of eliminating PSROs, in 1982 Congress replaced them with Peer
Review Organizations (PROs) and made several programmatic changes. 6 9 Of
greatest significance, Medicare administrators were armed with the authority to
negotiate service contracts with PROs and to offer those contracts on a competi-
tive basis.70 Competitive bidding gave Medicare officials more authority to
direct peer review activities toward areas of perceived greatest need.
Over time, PROs' contractual responsibilities have evolved. Early rounds of
contracting emphasized painstaking case-by-case utilization review.71 Yet PROs
made little headway on either cost control or quality improvement. In tacit
recognition of their failure, the Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA)-the
agency now known as CMS-announced in 1992 that PROs would shift away
from utilization review. PROs were instead to monitor patterns of care and give
providers the data and support they needed to improve the quality of patient
care. 72
Subsequent contracts have emphasized quality improvement efforts over
utilization review, 73 and in 2002, Medicare even began referring to PROs as
Quality Improvement Organizations.7 4 In their current incarnation, PROs act as
government-sponsored consultants. They enter into voluntary partnerships with
health-care organizations-in particular, hospitals and nursing homes-to share
data, teach best practices, and offer technical support. They bear little resem-
blance to the utilization review agencies that Congress once envisioned.
66. See id. sec. 249F(b), §§ 1157, 1160(b)(1)(A).
67. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECT OF PSROs ON HEALTH CARE COSTS: CURRENT FINDINGS AND
FUTURE EvALUAflONs, at x (1979), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/
doc9178/79doc659.pdf.
68. See Spencer Rich, Who Should Police Hospitals and Doctors?, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1983, at
A15.
69. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, subtit. C, 96 Stat.
324, 381.
70. See BETH C. FUCHS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 90-273 EPW, MEDICARE'S PEER REVIEW ORGANIZA-
TIONS 10 (1990).
71. See INST. OF MED., MEDICARE'S QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATION PROGRAM: MAXIMIZING
POTENTIAL 41 (2006).
72. See Stephen F. Jencks & Gail R. Wilensky, The Health Care Quality Improvement Initiative: A
New Approach to Quality Assurance in Medicare, 268 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 900, 900 (1992); see also
INST. OF MED., MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALTY ASSURANCE 2-4 (Kathleen N. Lohr ed., 1990)
(recommending that HCFA deemphasize case review and embrace a quality improvement mission).
73. See INST. OF MED., supra note 71, at 52.
74. See 67 Fed. Reg. 36539, 36539 (May 24, 2002).
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2. Assessment
Notwithstanding their $370 million annual price tag,7 PROs have done little
or nothing to enhance Medicare's ability to influence its physicians. To under-
stand how flawed programmatic architecture and congressional inattention have
contributed to the failure, it helps to distinguish between the two modes in
which PROs have operated: the assertive regulatory mode characterized by
utilization review, now largely abandoned, and the voluntary cooperative mode
that is ascendant today.
a. Utilization Review. When it created Medicare, Congress vested in physi-
cians frontline responsibility for deciding whether a given treatment is medi-
cally necessary and hence reimbursable. To carry out ex post claims review,
then, Congress had to embed physicians into the review process and ask them to
assess the medical necessity determinations of their fellow physicians. As
Congress saw it, no other group save physicians had the necessary medical
knowledge.
PRO physicians, however, approach this review task with considerable hesita-
tion. Medical necessity is not a crisp concept and scientific evidence rarely
establishes the inappropriateness of a particular course of treatment. Judgments
about medical necessity are also context-dependent, yet peer reviewers look
only to a cold and often incomplete patient record. They may be reluctant to
deny payment for medical services already rendered, and in any event, there is a
professional aversion to criticizing or sanctioning the work of other doctors.
Treating physicians subject to review are often piqued at what they perceive as
a referendum on their medical judgment from an outside physician who, lacking
direct patient contact, is in no good position to criticize.7 Apart from a medical
license, PRO reviewers have no particular qualifications and receive no special-
ized training.
Even if physicians had the appetite to diligently oversee their colleagues'
practice patterns, Medicare's medical necessity standard would limit their abil-
ity to curb over utilization. As Clark Havighurst and James Blumstein have
observed, much wasteful care may be marginally beneficial78-think here of
using an MRI to rule out a very unlikely diagnosis. But because peer review
only polices conformity with Medicare's cost blind coverage limitations, that
sort of needless care wouldn't raise a peer reviewer's eyebrow.
75. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-116R, MEDICARE: CMS NEEDS To COLLECT
CONSISTENT INFORMATION FROM QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATIONs To STRENGTHEN ITS ESTABLISHMENT
OF BUDGETS FOR QUALITY OF CARE REVIEWs 2 (2010).
76. See FUCHS, supra note 70, at 47 ("[T]he review process can become contentious.").
77. See Haya R. Rubin et al., Watching the Doctor-Watchers: How Well Do Peer Review Organiza-
tion Methods Detect Health Care Quality Problems?, 267 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2349, 2350 (1992).
78. See Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical
Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 32 (1975).
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To give peer review teeth, PROs are supposed to sanction and even exclude
those providers that abuse Medicare. In this, however, they are paper tigers. As
a natural consequence of allowing all licensed providers to participate in
Medicare, there is immense political pressure to afford them robust procedural
protections before imposing sanctions. In the absence of a coherent constituency
pushing for a streamlined sanctions scheme, Congress has bowed to that
pressure. The resulting process for sanctioning providers is arcane and cumber-
some, even by Medicare standards, 79 and providers can only be excluded from
Medicare if they have failed "substantially" to comply with Medicare rules in a
"substantial" number of cases or have "grossly and flagrantly" violated the
rules.so Unsurprisingly, PROs almost never recommend sanctions.s1
Standard contractual tools have been ineffective at improving PRO perfor-
mance. There is little competition in awarding PRO contracts 8 2 and the already
overstretched federal bureaucracy has a poor record of monitoring PRO con-
duct. 8 3 Nor are PROs entirely to blame for their lackluster performance. Con-
gress has given them nowhere near the resources that they would need to police
the 4.8 million claims that Medicare processes every day.84 Plus, Medicare's
balkanized structure denies them direct access to the information they need to
do their jobs. Fiscal intermediaries and carriers must share claims data to enable
PRO review and, when PROs disapprove payment for medical services, they
must then coordinate with these contractors to dock provider reimbursement.
This complex information-sharing process hampers effective, timely case re-
view.85
Unsurprisingly, PROs engaging in utilization review have made no dent in
rising Medicare costs. 8 6 Nor have they improved quality of care: a number of
79. For a chart detailing the process that will make your head hurt, see INST. OF MED., supra note 72,
at 164 fig.6.2A.
80. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, sec.143, § 1156(b)(1), 96
Stat. 381, 388.
81. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-06-00170, QUALITY
CONCERNS IDENTIFIED THROUGH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATION MEDICAL RECORD REVIEws, at ii
(2007) (finding that QIOs (PROs) "rarely initiated sanction activity in response to a confirmed [quality]
concern").
82. See INST. OF MED., supra note 71, at 72 (noting a "history of very limited competition for QIO
contracts").
83. See id. at 76-78 (finding serious deficiencies in QIO contract monitoring by CMS); see also
FUCHS, supra note 70, at 17 (same); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: BETrER
CONTROLS NEEDED FOR PEER REvIEw ORGANIZATIONS' EVALUATIONs 4 (1987) (same).
84. See Berwick Statement, supra note 2, at 34 (reporting that Medicare processes 4.8 million claims
every day).
85. See FUCHS, supra note 70, at 21, 54 (discussing PRO-contractor coordination challenges); LAW,
supra note 33, at 129 (same).
86. Even during the heyday of utilization review, PROs denied or reduced payment for the provision
of unnecessary care in just two percent of reviewed cases. See FUCHS, supra note 70, at 37. In 2006,
PROs nationwide identified just $14.5 million in overpayments to hospitals, see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATION
(QIO) PROGRAM FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 5 (2009), representing less than
0.005% of what Medicare spent in Part A outlays.
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studies have found that PROs are almost comically bad at identifying quality
problems.
b. Voluntary Cooperation. As the ineffectiveness of case review became appar-
ent, Medicare gave it up. Over time, PROs have shifted toward voluntary,
cooperative efforts focused on quality improvement. These more conciliatory
efforts, however, appear no more successful than case review at changing
physician practice patterns. In 2006, after reviewing the extant studies, the
Institute of Medicine concluded that the quality records of hospitals that cooper-
ate with PROs are almost indistinguishable from those that do not.8 8 Although a
few studies have observed modest quality improvement in hospitals that partici-
pated in PRO-sponsored efforts, similar quality measures have tended to im-
prove at non-PRO hospitals. 8 9 Anecdotally, the overwhelming majority of
providers believe that PROs are useless.90
Why this poor record? The root cause, again, is Congress's inattention to
whether the private actors that it has embedded in a flawed Medicare program
have the incentives, capacity, and legitimacy to adjust physician practice pat-
terns. Three blind spots are of particular importance.
First, lacking the resources to coordinate with the hundreds of thousands of
private physicians that implement Medicare, PROs focus their quality improve-
ment efforts on hospitals (and, to a lesser extent, nursing homes). They basically
ignore quality issues that arise in physician practices-an enormous gap for a
program where the need for high-quality outpatient care to treat chronic condi-
tions is essential.
Second, hospitals often lack much influence over the physicians that work
there. The split between Medicare Parts A and B reinforces the tendency of
physicians to operate independently of the hospitals in which they practice.
Why should physicians affiliate more closely with hospitals when they can
secure a healthy income directly through Part B? As one hospital quality
manager has implored CMS, "Go to the physicians directly. We can monitor all
those indicators, but it's in the physicians' power. If they don't prescribe the
87. See INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 183 (concluding that case review provides a "poor yield of
true quality problems"); Rubin et al., supra note 77, at 2353 (finding that medical experts and the PRO
agreed about the existence of quality-related issues about as often as would be expected by chance).
88. See INST. OF MED., supra note 71, at 234; see also Claire Snyder & Gerard Anderson, Do Quality
Improvement Organizations Improve the Quality of Hospital Care for Medicare Beneficiaries?, 293 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 2900, 2900 (2005) (same).
89. See Stephen F. Jencks et al., Change in the Quality of Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries,
1998-1999 to 2000-2001, 289 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 305, 305 (2003) (noting that improved performance
was "consistent with QIO activities" but could not be attributed to the QIOs' quality improvement
efforts); Thomas A. Marciniak et al., Improving the Quality of Care for Medicare Patients with Acute
Myocardial Infarction: Results from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, 279 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
1351 (1998) (reporting similar results); William Rollow et al., Assessment of the Medicare Quality
Improvement Organization Program, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 342 (2006) (reporting similar results).
90. See TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE
QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 320 (1996).
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aspirin at discharge, it's not the hospital's [fault]."91
Third, hospitals aren't all that receptive to PRO influence. Medicare eligibil-
ity depends not one whit on cooperating with PROs. Hospitals are more likely
to attend to the quality concerns raised by the Joint Commission (which can
withdraw accreditation) or insurers (who can remove hospitals from their
networks) than to those raised by PROs (which can do nothing). Predictably,
voluntary quality-improvement efforts involve those hospitals that are most
receptive to PRO help-a group that is unlikely to include those hospitals in
greatest need of it.9 2 What's more, instituting quality improvement measures
may, perversely, lead to reduced compensation for hospitals and other provid-
ers.93 Absent a persuasive business case for quality improvements, even those
institutional providers inclined in principle to cooperate with PROs may decline
to dedicate the resources to the difficult business of shifting physicians' practice
patterns.
As a strategy for assuring that dispersed line officers adhere to the concerns
of the central bureaucracy, peer review has failed miserably. Physicians are
loath to second-guess their colleagues' work, and various structural features of
Medicare-the cost blindness of medical necessity, the bifurcated claims-based
payment system, the decentralized administrative apparatus, and the sheer
volume of claims-further impair the sort of utilization review that Congress
originally envisioned. Nor has the shift to quality consulting fared any better.
PROs can encourage hospitals to oversee their physicians all they want, but
hospitals have few incentives and insufficient capacity to play along. Indeed,
Medicare's payment model discourages quality improvement efforts that would
harm hospitals' bottom lines.
As the peer review example suggests, efforts to assert control over the
physicians that implement Medicare on the ground must be tailored to institu-
tional context and subject to effective management. Yet policy makers rarely
attend to these mundane implementation questions. Nor is Medicare alone in its
poor experience with outsourcing auditing functions. As Paul Posner has noted,
parceling out auditing authority to private third parties is most appealing when
the central bureaucracy suffers from resource constraints. These same con-
straints, however, routinely plague efforts to oversee the auditors themselves.9 4
91. Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., From Adversary to Partner: Have Quality Improvement Organiza-
tions Made the Transition?, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 459, 471 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
92. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-373, NURsING HoMEs: FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED
To IMPROVE TARGETING AND EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE BY QuALITY IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 4-5
(2007).
93. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 220.
94. See Posner, supra note 61, at 540 ("Although a delegated, ex post oversight process may cover
salient instances of third-party noncompliance, it would be unrealistic to expect this process to ensure
that programs are responsibly and efficiently managed.").
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B. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
1. Background
The apparent failure of peer review to constrain relentless increases in
Medicare expenditures drew Congress's attention to alternative strategies. In the
next round of reform, Congress pinned its hopes on changing how hospitals
were paid. To that end, in 1983 Congress adopted the "prospective payment
system," still in place today, under which hospital patients are assigned at
discharge, depending on their diagnosis, to differently weighted diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs).9 5 To determine how much to pay a hospital for a
particular patient stay, the assigned DRG is multiplied by the national average
cost of treating a hospital patient (subject to variations for, among other things,
high- and low-wage areas).96
The shift to prospective payment flipped hospitals' former financial incen-
tives. Under the preexisting "reasonable cost" approach, a hospital earned more
for long and resource-intensive stays. Under the prospective payment system,
however, a hospital that spends less on a particular patient than the DRG-
weighted payment can retain the excess, and a hospital that spends more is in
the hole. As such, it is generally in a hospital's financial interest to treat patients
conservatively and discharge them quickly.9 7 Congress's hope was that prospec-
tive payment would encourage hospitals to push their physicians to adopt
low-cost practice patterns.9 8
Physicians, however, remained free to bill Medicare for their reasonable
charges. And during the 1980s, physician payments began spiraling out of
control. 99 Alarmed, in 1989 Congress called for the creation of a fee schedule
for physician payments. Establishing this fee schedule required estimating the
relative "work" (measured with reference to time, stress, and physical and
mental effort) for every medical service. Each service was then assigned a
relative value unit (RVU) depending on the work that went into the service. A
service that required twice as much "work" as another was assigned an RVU
twice as high. To calculate what a physician was owed under the fee schedule,
95. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. 6, 97 Stat. 65, 149 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d).
97. In practice, DRGs are not always keyed to patient diagnoses. As Mark McClellan has observed,
some particular treatments or types of treatments-primarily intensive surgical procedures-still
define administered price groups," and "one can imagine a more aggregated DRG system at the level of
diagnoses only." See Mark B. McClellan, Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth, in
ADVANCES IN THE EcoNoMIcs oF AGING 149, 159 (David A. Wise ed. 1996).
98. Skilled nursing facilities, outpatient hospital clinics, and home health agencies entered similar
prospective payment systems in 1997. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, sec.
4432, § 1395yy, 11 Stat. 251, 414-22 (skilled nursing); id. sec. 4523, § 13951 (outpatient hospital); id.
sec. 4603, § 1395 et. seq. (home health).
99. Between 1978 and 1987, when coverage expanded minimally and enrollment grew by about two
percent annually, physician payments increased sixteen percent each year on average. See MAYEs &
BERENSON, supra note 22, at 83.
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the RVU for the service was multiplied by a practice expense adjustment
(practices in high cost areas have a higher adjustment) and a monetary conver-
sion factor that Congress updates each year.100 The end result, known as the
resource-based relative value scale (RB-RVS), went into effect in 1992 and
remains in effect today.o0
Consistent with Medicare's commitment to cost reimbursement, the goal of
the fee schedule was to roughly match the costs of providing care. 10 2 The
schedule, however, still tied physician reimbursement to treatment intensity and
volume. To counter the inflationary incentives of this fee-for-service system,
Congress adopted an annual expenditure target now known as the sustainable
growth rate (SGR), which is linked to the rate in GDP growth. 10 3 If physician
payments for a particular year exceeded the target, fee-schedule payments
would be cut.
2. Assessment
More than any other change in Medicare, prospective payment has slowed
the rate of cost escalation. The effect has been particularly pronounced for
hospital inpatient care.0 Without denying its successes, however, prospective
payment has not enabled Medicare to assert sufficient authority over its bedside
bureaucrats. At best, the prospective payment system serves as a partial and
imperfect stopgap measure.
a. Cost Control. Prospective payment for inpatient hospitalizations was sup-
posed to encourage hospitals to adjust the practice patterns of their affiliated
physicians. In this respect, it has proven a qualified failure. Although hospitals
have successfully encouraged early discharges, they have otherwise only mod-
estly reshaped how physicians practice medicine.1 05 This is in large part be-
cause physicians are not usually employed by the hospitals in which they work
and have a secure source of fee-for-service revenue through Medicare Part B,
even for care provided in an inpatient hospital setting. As Mark McClellan
observes, "[v]esting the residual rights of production [for example, treatment]
decisions in the physician, and separating physicians reimbursement incentives
from hospital reimbursement incentives, clearly reduces the strength of the
physician-hospital agency relationship."o6 Not only do hospitals often enjoy
100. See 76 Fed. Reg. 42772, 42778 (July 19, 2011).
101. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, sec. 6102, § 1848, 103
Stat. 2106, 2169.
102. See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 22, at 87.
103. See Bruce C. Viadeck, Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1955, 1955 (2010). Initially known as the "volume performance standard," the spending cap was
amended and renamed in 1997.
104. See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 22, at 51, 53 tbl.3.1.
105. See id. at 54 ("The extent to which Medicare's new payment model transformed physician
behavior turned out to be relatively modest.").
106. See McClellan, supra note 97, at 155.
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little leverage over physicians, but hospitals' financial incentives (decrease care
intensity) are at loggerheads with those of their medical staffs (increase care
intensity). Further complicating matters, the Medicare statute prohibits hospitals
from making any "payment, directly or indirectly, to a physician as an induce-
ment to reduce or limit services provided" to Medicare beneficiaries.1 07
Instead of pushing physicians to practice cost-conscious care, hospitals have
instead cut costs in three principal ways. First, they have reduced overhead and
eliminated staff, particularly nurses.108 Second, they have shifted patients from
inpatient to outpatient settings. 109 As other institutional providers-skilled nurs-
ing facilities, home health-care agencies, and ambulatory surgery centers-have
come under prospective payment, the locus of care has lurched toward physi-
cian offices. Costs are shifted, not necessarily reduced. Third, some hospitals
have inflated Medicare payments by "upcoding" patients-improperly shifting a
patient's diagnosis from one DRG code to a more profitable one.1 10 A functional
bureaucracy might police this sort of manipulative behavior, but Medicare lacks
a functional bureaucracy.
What's more, and contrary to expectations, prospective payment did not
discourage the adoption and use of expensive new technologies of uncertain
value. Under the physician fee schedule, such new technologies often involve
more "work" and are thus better remunerated. Hospitals in turn compete to
attract physicians who, in part for financial reasons, want to use the new
technology. Because DRGs are periodically updated whenever a sufficient
number of hospitals adopt a new technology,11 hospitals are too ready to
embrace costly medical innovations without regard to their benefits. Medicare
administrators can do little to address this problem. Setting DRGs for new
technologies with reference to anticipated health outcomes would, if it contem-
plated below-cost reimbursement, violate the Medicare statute's mandate to
reimburse for all reasonable and necessary care. 11 2
Restraining payments to physicians under the fee schedule has posed a
particularly vexing challenge. Congress's most assertive effort to counteract the
incentives generated by a fee-for-service payment system-the global cap on
Part B payments known as the SGR-has proven ineffective. The hope was that
the SGR would "encourage the leadership of medicine to become more active in
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (2006).
108. See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 22, at 53.
109. See Bruce C. Viadeck, Hospital Prospective Payment and the Quality of Care, 319 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1411, 1411-12 (1988).
110. See David C. Hsia et al., Accuracy of Diagnostic Coding for Medicare Patients Under the
Prospective-Payment System, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 352 (1988) (describing a study from the Office of
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services finding rampant DRG creep).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 108-391, at 553 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (describing 1997 amendments to force
HCFA to periodically "recognize the costs of new medical services and technologies for discharges" as
well as 2003 revisions increasing the generosity of updates).
112. See Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82
VA. L. REv. 1525, 1558 (1996).
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the support of activities to better inform physicians of the medical benefits and
risks of procedures, and to play a more active and constructive role in peer
review activities."11 3 That hope never materialized. Although physicians as a
group stand to see their compensation fall if they bill Medicare for too many
services, an individual physician maximizes her reimbursement by increasing
the volume and intensity of the care she provides. It's a standard collective-
action problem. Medical societies have not assumed the wished-for leadership
role in promoting cost-conscious care,114 and why would they? They're trade
associations, not regulators.
As physician expenditures have exceeded the caps, Congress has repeatedly
caved to overwhelming political pressure not to follow through with promised
cuts. This too is a consequence of Medicare's design. By including virtually all
physicians in a program on which their livelihoods depend, Congress has
enabled a powerful constituency to mobilize against slashing payment rates. As
a result, Part B costs have increased at an average rate of nine percent annually
over the past decade.115
Part of the trouble is that the overstretched CMS bureaucracy cannot itself
update the thousands of RVUs that form the backbone of the fee schedule. Out
of necessity, the agency has enlisted the help of an AMA panel called the
Specialty Society Relative Value Update Committee (RUC), comprising mainly
physician specialists, to review codes and recommend updates. 1 16 Lacking the
resources and expertise necessary to push back with any force, CMS approves
nine out of every ten RUC recommendations.11 7 As Uwe Reinhardt has noted,
CMS has de jure authority to adjust rates, but the RUC is the de facto decision
maker.s18 The large majority of adjustments increase the RVUs for particular
medical services, and most of those adjustments are for specialty services. That
encourages Medicare's bureaucrats at the bedside to provide larger volumes of
these often expensive services.11 9
Even if it had the resources, CMS lacks the timely data it would need to
update the fee schedule. As it stands, CMS must wait eighteen months or more
for claims data from its carriers-another consequence of using contractors to
process claims. 12 0 The lag time creates problems when a new treatment is
113. PHYsicIN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESs 208 (1989).
114. See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 22, at 92.
115. Data for this calculation were drawn from the Department of Labor's assessment of annual
CPI-U and from the annual reports of the Boards of Trustees for the Medicare Trust Funds.
116. See 76 Fed. Reg. 42772, 42778 (July 19, 2011).
117. See Miriam J. Laugesen et al., In Setting Doctors'Medicare Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts
the Relative Value Update Panel'sAdvice on Work Values, 31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 965 (2012).
118. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Little-Known Decision-Makers for Medicare Physicians Fees, N.Y.
TIMEs EcoNomix BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/the-
little-known-decision-makers-for-medicare-physicans-fees/.
119. See Viadeck, supra note 103, at 1956.
120. See Chantal Worzala et al., Challenges and Opportunities for Medicare's Original Prospective
Payment System, 22 HEALTH AFF. 175, 177-78 (2003); see also MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 22, at
66-67 ("[T]he difference between making decisions in 'real time' versus 'lag time' is significant.").
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introduced. The payment for the service is typically pegged to the initial costs
of the treatment, but those costs often decline as the treatment becomes more
common. The absence of timely review means that, over time, the new proce-
dure is overcompensated and, hence, overprovided by Medicare's physicians. In
the meantime, categories of services that lack new procedures-in particular,
primary care-become relatively less remunerative. 12 1
b. Quality Improvement. There is little evidence that the shift to prospective
payment has pushed physicians to practice higher quality care. 1 2 2 To the con-
trary, prospective payment may exacerbate some quality concerns.
In the hospital setting, prospective payment rewards hospitals for providing
low-quality care if such care leads to complications that generate higher DRG
classifications or rapid readmissions. 1 2 3 In addition, hospital encouragement of
early discharges poses a risk that patients will be discharged "quicker and
sicker,"124 especially where too-early discharges may lead to readmissions.
Hospitals have also slashed nursing staff in response to prospective payment.
This too is a consequence of Medicare's architecture-the fact that physicians
are paid separately from the hospitals in which they practice means that hospital
administrators often find it easier to fire nurses than to shift physician practice
patterns. But it's problematic. Copious research suggests that reductions in
nursing staff contribute to lower quality care.1 2 5
For physicians, the quality concerns are different. The fee schedule encour-
ages physicians to overuse specialty services, some of which are harmful to
patients. Consider imaging services, for example. Because of the fee-for-service
incentives baked into the fee schedule, physicians who own or lease their own
imaging equipment can bill for each and every scan that they order. The result
has been explosive growth in the volume of inappropriate diagnostic imaging
121. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 16 (2011).
122. See David M. Cutler, The Incidence ofAdverse Medical Outcomes Under Prospective Payment,
63 ECONOMETRICA 29, 29 (1995) (finding that, under prospective payment, "[t]here are more deaths in
the hospital and the first two months post-discharge, but there is no change in the percentage of patients
who have died after one year"); John F. Fitzgerald et al., The Care of Elderly Patients with Hip
Fracture: Changes Since Implementation of the Prospective Payment System, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1392, 1396 (1988) (finding worse quality outcomes for hip fractures after introduction of prospective
payment). But see Lisa V. Rubenstein et al., Changes in Quality of Care for Five Diseases Measured by
Implicit Review, 1981 to 1986, 264 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1974, 1977 (1990) (finding that quality of care
for congestive heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, cerebrovascular accident, and hip
fracture improved after introduction of prospective payment).
123. See DAVID C. GOODMAN ET AL., AFTER HOSPITALIZATION: A DARTMOUTH ATLAS REPORT ON POST-
ACUTE CARE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (2011) (documenting wide variation in readmission rates).
124. See Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Discharge: The
Quicker-and-Sicker Story Revisited, 264 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1980, 1982 (1990) (finding a forty-three
percent increase in unstable discharges after adoption of prospective payment).
125. See INST. OF MED., KEEPING PmENTS SAFE: TRANSFORMING THE WORK ENVIRONMENT OF NURSES
171 (2004); Jonathan Gruber & Samuel A. Kleiner, Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State, 4
AM. EcON. J. 127, 128 (2012).
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services, including CT scans. 1 2 6 Yet CT scans involve relatively high doses of
radiation and increase cancer risks. 12 7 To the extent that it encourages intensive
medical care of negligible value, the fee schedule is inimical to quality care.
When it comes to restraining cost growth, prospective payment remains the
most successful reform in Medicare's history. But congressional inattention to
the incentives and capacities of hospitals and medical societies, combined with
Medicare's rickety administrative structure, has undermined its effectiveness in
reshaping how physicians practice medicine. Hospitals often have little capacity
to change how physicians with a separate source of revenue do their jobs.
Medicare's abiding commitment to compensating for the full costs of care
encourages both physicians and hospitals to adopt new and expensive technolo-
gies. When it comes to adhering to the global cap on Part B growth, medical
societies have never tried to restrain physician expenditures. And a hollow
central bureaucracy without access to timely data has struggled, without much
success, to restrain growth in payment rates to intensive specialty services.
C. MEDICARE MANAGED CARE
1. Background
Believing that the market holds promise for controlling costs and improving
quality, Congress has long authorized Medicare to purchase private insurance
from managed-care organizations on behalf of its enrollees.12 8 The program
assumed a prominent place in Medicare after legislation was enacted in 1982
authorizing the payment of a capitated amount-ninety-five percent of the per
capita expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries in the same county-for each
enrollee in an approved health maintenance organization (HMO).12 9 The assump-
tion was that the HMOs could provide a full range of benefits more cheaply
than traditional Medicare. 13 0 That assumption proved faulty. Because these
HMOs enrolled disproportionately healthy beneficiaries, they increased overall
Medicare expenditures. 131
Redoubling its commitment to managed care, in 1997 Congress dubbed the
program Medicare+Choice and expanded the range of insurance organizations
126. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 121, at 35-36 (describing the eighty-five
percent growth in imaging between 2000 and 2009).
127. See David J. Brenner & Eric. J. Hall, Computed Tomography-An Increasing Source of
Radiation Exposure, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2277, 2281-82 (2007).
128. See 1972 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 226, § 1876, 86 Stat. 1329.
129. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, sec. 114(a),
§ 1876(a)(1)(C), 96 Stat. 324, 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(a)(1)(C) (2006)).
130. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-161, MEDICARE+CHOICE: PAYMENTS EXCEED
COST OF FEE-FOR-SERVICE BENEFITS, ADDING BILLIONS TO SPENDING 6 (2000).
131. See id. at 3-4.
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that could contract with HCFA. 13 2 To keep costs in check, however, Congress
also introduced risk adjustment (it would pay more for sicker enrollees and less
for healthier enrollees) and capped most annual increases in payments to private
plans. 13 3 It quickly became apparent that Congress had cut into bone. A growing
imbalance between rapidly rising medical costs and the low rate of increase in
Medicare payments meant that offering Medicare+Choice plans became unprof-
itable for many insurers. Many fled the program. 1 34
So in 2003, Congress again renamed the program-it would now be known
as Medicare Advantage-and gave back what it had taken away. 1 3 5 Medicare
Advantage remains in place today. To implement the program, CMS establishes
county-level and regional benchmark amounts. Those benchmarks are in turn
set through a complicated formula at an amount that exceeds the average costs
of care for an enrollee in traditional Medicare. Local managed care plans then
submit "bids," which are their estimates of what it will cost to cover an average
enrollee. If a plan's bid is greater than the benchmark, Medicare will pay only
the benchmark and enrollees must pay larger premiums to make up the differ-
ence. If a plan's bid is less than the benchmark, the plan is paid its bid plus a
rebate of 75 percent of the difference between the benchmark and the bid.
The inflated benchmarks, together with the rebates, means that Medicare
Advantage plans receive artificially high capitated payments for every enrolled
beneficiary. After 2003, insurers flocked back into the program, and by 2010,
almost one in four Medicare beneficiaries was enrolled in a Medicare Advan-
tage plan. 1 3 6 At the same time, however, per capita spending for Medicare
Advantage beneficiaries was fourteen percent higher than under traditional
Medicare. 1 37
To cut what were thought to be excessive payments to Medicare Advantage
plans, the ACA slashed the benchmark calculation. 1 3 8 In a move that partly
offsets the ACA's cuts, however, CMS has recently rolled out a controversial
"quality bonus" program that inflates reimbursement for the Medicare Advan-
tage plans that cover almost all enrollees. 1 3 9 Because the new benchmarks still
exceed what traditional Medicare would have spent, because of the quality
bonus program, and because managed-care plans are adept at enrolling low-risk
132. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFus JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 114-15 (2003).
133. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, sec. 4001, §§ 1853(a)(3), 1853(c), 111
Stat. 251, 300-05 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-23(a)(3), 1395w-(c) (2006)).
134. See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive 'Level
Playing Field,' 15 HEALTH AFF. 572, 574 (2004).
135. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, tit. II, 117 Stat. 2066, 2176-221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2006)).
136. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY
291 (2011).
137. See id. at 294.
138. See id. at 263-65.
139. See id. at 309.
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beneficiaries, it still costs about seven percent more to cover an enrollee under
Medicare Advantage than under traditional Medicare. 14 0
2. Assessment
For all its promise of tapping into market efficiencies, Medicare managed
care has performed abysmally as a cost-control device. The reason, as before, is
Congress's inattention to the incentives, capacity, and legitimacy of the private
actors that it has embedded in Medicare to assert control over physicians.
The most serious challenge for private plans is that Congress put them in
competition for enrollment with traditional Medicare, which guarantees enroll-
ees free choice of provider and imposes few obstacles to receiving desired care.
Medicare beneficiaries can opt out of Medicare Advantage plans almost at
will. 14 1 Plus, there is little financial downside to switching to traditional Medi-
care.14 2 As a result, the more aggressively a private plan manages care-by
excluding high-cost physicians from networks, requiring specialist referrals
from "gatekeeper" primary care doctors, or engaging in utilization review-the
more likely a beneficiary will abandon the private plan for traditional Medi-
care. 14 3 In short, pushing physicians to change how they practice medicine
threatens to depress enrollment.
In the face of this competition, Medicare Advantage plans remain viable by
securing extra funding that they pass on to enrollees in the form of expanded
benefits or reductions in Part B premiums. That extra funding comes from
linking Medicare Advantage payments to benchmarks that exceed what tradi-
tional Medicare spends on enrollees.144 Paying at parity, as the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has advocated for a decade, would
likely lead to an exodus of private plans. (Fear of such an exodus is probably
why CMS rolled out its otherwise indefensible "quality bonus" program.) But
tying Medicare Advantage payments to cost inflation in traditional Medicare
erodes the cost advantage that the plans are supposed to provide.
The problem runs deeper than this competitive mismatch. The collapse of the
managed-care revolution in the late 1990s suggests that many (although not all)
Medicare Advantage plans operate at too far a remove from the physicians with
140. See id.
141. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Tip SHEET: UNDERSTANDING MEDICARE ENROLLMENT
PERIODS 7, 11 (2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11219.pdf (explaining that benefi-
ciaries can, at a minimum, opt out of Medicare Advantage from January 1 through February 14 and
from October 15 through December 7 of each year).
142. Some private plans are free, but so is Part A, and it costs less than $100 per month for most
beneficiaries to enroll in Part B. See HHS FAQ, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://
answers.hhs.gov/questions/3006 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
143. See JOST, supra note 132, at 119-20.
144. See NAT'L AcAD. OF Soc. INS., FINAL REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE AND MARKETS:
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE HEATH PLANS IN MEDICARE: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 46
(Kathleen M. King & Mark Schlesinger eds., 2003) ("The payment structure established by Congress is
an administered-pricing system, not a market-based system.").
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whom they contract to enlist them in a cooperative cost-reduction and quality-
improvement endeavor. 14 5 First, even the most lavishly detailed contract can't
specify in advance the complex bundle of low-cost, high-quality services that
the insurers would prefer to purchase. Second, financial incentives included in
managed care contracts are at best blunt and imprecise instruments to reshape
how physicians practice medicine. Third, insurers cannot reliably monitor how
physicians carry out their contractual responsibilities. As James Robinson has
described, "[i]nsurers lack the clinical skills ... to distinguish the experimental
from the accepted therapy, the appropriate from the inappropriate procedure, the
qualified from the unqualified physician, or the patient who is truly ill from the
worried well." 14 6 Fourth, outside are insurers perceived as heavy-handed and
illegitimate and face intense physician resistance. 14 7 At a minimum, the conflict
that defines the relationship between insurers and physicians impedes the sort of
collaborative innovation upon which successful reform depends. 14 8
Medicare managed care-like all managed care-also raises quality concerns
because its capitated payments create incentives for plans to encourage their
affiliated physicians to stint on care. Stinting may be especially attractive to
Medicare Advantage plans if, as the evidence indicates, it encourages the
costliest enrollees to switch back to traditional Medicare. 14 9 Yet CMS's resource
constraints have given rise to acute managerial shortcomings when it comes to
overseeing managed-care plans.1 50 Overwhelmed, CMS has been faulted time
and again for shoddy oversight.15 1
What's more, the limited oversight that does occur does not emphasize
quality of care. For quality review, the agency depends on reports of perfor-
mance measures that fail to capture important aspects of plan performance. 15 2
And regional CMS teams charged with on-site monitoring typically lack the
staffing and the medical expertise to assess the quality of medical care pro-
145. Cf id. at 93 ("There is little evidence that private insurance, which relies on market forces, has
reduced the rate of growth in private health spending over the long term .... ").
146. James C. Robinson, The End ofManaged Care, 285 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2622, 2627 (2001).
147. Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, 16 HEALTH AFF. 171, 174 (1997) (discussing physi-
cian resistance).
148. See Payton, supra note 15, at 136.
149. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Favorable Selection, Risk Adjustment, and the Medicare
Advantage Program, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. (forthcoming 2013) (providing evidence that disenrollment
from Medicare Advantage plans is "disproportionately concentrated among the highest cost beneficia-
ries").
150. See Richard Kronick, Medicare and HMOs-The Search for Accountability, 360 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 2048, 2050 (2009) ("CMS lacks the mandate, resources, and flexibility to hold private health
plans accountable. . . .").
151. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-96-00191, MEDI-
CARE's OVERSIGHT OF MANAGED CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STAFFING, at i-ii (1998); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-00-108, MEDICARE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES PROMPT FRESH THINK-
ING ABOUT PROGRAM'S ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 8 (2000).
152. See NAT'L AcAD. OF Soc. INs., supra note 144, at 15 (reporting that "none of the current
mechanisms for monitoring quality under either original Medicare or [Medicare+ Choice] can measure
certain crucial dimensions of practice").
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vided. 1 5 3 Notwithstanding the purported care management prowess of Medicare
Advantage plans, the evidence suggests that they perform no better than tradi-
tional Medicare on most dimensions and may do worse for beneficiaries with
chronic conditions. 1 5 4
Medicare Advantage is a fraught program. By putting private plans in compe-
tition with a traditional Medicare program that eschews managed-care tools,
Congress has hobbled private plans' capacity to use those very tools to control
the behavior of Medicare's physicians. As important, private insurers are typi-
cally unable to work cooperatively with physicians to account for governmental
priorities. On top of that, Medicare's weakened central administration is inca-
pable of assuring that private plans do not stint on needed care. The result is a
managed-care program that neither saves money nor improves quality.
D. COVERAGE LIMITATIONS
1. Background
Per the original 1965 statute, Medicare excluded coverage for care that was
"not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury."155 This language remains in force today1 5 6 and has in practice been
understood to exclude medically unnecessary services. In Medicare's early
years, physicians and hospitals would coordinate with fiscal intermediaries and
carriers to establish the scope of covered services, with significant deference
given to physicians' assessment of medical necessity.15 7 Few coverage ques-
tions demanded the attention of the federal bureaucracy.
As the fiscal consequences of paying for expensive new services became
more apparent, however, pressure for additional federal oversight grew. On
three separate occasions since the early 1980s, HCFA (now CMS) explored the
possibility of excluding cost-ineffective treatments from the scope of Medicare
coverage.15 8 Each time, however, HCFA retreated in the face of fierce opposi-
tion from providers invoking fears of government rationing. 1 5 9 Thrice denied,
CMS still lacks a regulation defining "reasonable and necessary." But the
153. See Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Care and Medicare Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 595, 623 (1997).
154. See id. at 610-11 (canvassing mixed evidence on quality of care in HMOs).
155. 1965 Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1862(a)(1) 79 Stat. 325 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2006)).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006).
157. See Sean R. Tunis, Why Medicare Has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 350
NEw ENG. J. MED. 2196, 2196 (2004).
158. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 4302 (Jan. 30, 1989) (proposing consideration of cost-effectiveness); 65
Fed. Reg. 31124 (May 16, 2000) (proposing that HCFA consider "added value" of medical procedures).
159. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Why Medicare Cannot Promulgate a National Coverage Rule: A Case
of Regula Mortis, 27 J. HEALH POL. PoL'Y & L. 707, 713-20 (2002).
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agency is quite clear that "the cost of a particular technology is not relevant in
the determination of whether the technology improves health outcomes or
should be covered for the Medicare population." 1 6 0 (Cost considerations, how-
ever, do appear to surreptitiously influence the level of scrutiny that CMS gives
to new procedures.) 1 6 1
With that cost blind rule in mind, the Medicare program issues thousands of
coverage determinations relating to medical efficacy each year.1 6 2 The over-
whelming majority of such determinations issue from Medicare's insurance
contractors (fiscal intermediaries and carriers); these "local coverage determina-
tions" (LCDs) govern only in the contractors' catchment areas. 16 3 To date,
Medicare contractors have issued more than 2,000 LCDs. 1 64 Most LCDs are not
all-or-nothing determinations and instead provide that the treatment in question
will be covered only for certain populations or conditions.16 5
When there are conflicting LCDs on a particular technology, or when the
technology is especially controversial, CMS may initiate proceedings to make a
national coverage determination (NCD). 16 6 CMS issues between ten and fifteen
NCDs for controversial technologies each year,167 for a total, to date, of 331
NCDs. 16 8 Fiscal intermediaries and carriers are responsible for policing compli-
ance with NCDs and LCDs.
2. Assessment
The adoption of new medical technology, much of it of questionable medical
value, appears to account for about fifty percent of Medicare's cost growth. 16 9
160. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVs., FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A NATIONAL
COVERAGE DETERMINATION (2006).
161. See Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency, and the
Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
162. See Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA),
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 423(b)(a), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(l)(2)(E)
(2006)) (formalizing the coverage determination process).
163. See Alan M. Garber, Commentary, The Impact of Medicare Coverage Policies on Health Care
Utilization, 43 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1302, 1303 (2008).
164. See Susan Bartlett Foote et al., The Impact of Medicare Coverage Policies on Health Care
Utilization, 43 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1285, 1287 (2008).
165. See id. at 1289-93 (describing coverage restrictions of various LCDs).
166. See 64 Fed. Reg. 22619, 22621 (Apr. 27, 1999).
167. See Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare's National Coverage Decisions for Technologies,
1999-2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1620, 1621 (2008).
168. See Medicare Coverage Database, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/
medicare-coverage-database/overview-and-quick-search.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (select "Na-
tional Coverage Documents"; then follow "Search By Type" hyperlink).
169. See David. M. Cutler, Technology, Health Costs, and the NIH 9 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the National Institutes of Health and Economics Roundtable on Biomedical
Research), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edulfiles/faculty/13_Technology,%2OHealth%20
Costs%20and%20the%20NIH.pdf. But see Sheila Smith et al., Income, Insurance, and Technology:
Why Does Health Spending Outpace Economic Growth?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1276, 1276, 1281 (2009)
("We estimate that medical technology explains 27-48 percent of health spending growth since
1960-a smaller percentage than earlier estimates.").
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For at least three reasons, however, coverage determinations have not enabled
fiscal intermediaries and carriers to deter Medicare's physicians from adopting
novel and unproven technologies.
First, Medicare's contractors have neither the capacity nor the incentives to
enforce compliance with the thousands of local coverage determinations they
issue each year. To get a sense of the scope of the enforcement challenge,
consider that most LCDs conditionally approve medical interventions for use in
certain subpopulations. Checking whether providers have complied with LCDs
thus requires detailed clinical information-information that is rarely found in
claims forms. 170 (The same sort of problem has plagued PRO efforts at utiliza-
tion review.)171 Although Medicare's contractors can and sometimes do request
additional information, the cost of collecting clinical information on millions of
claims relating to thousands of different LCDs would be prohibitive. 1 7 2 In any
event, the contractors have few incentives to assiduously enforce coverage
determinations. There is no indication that CMS evaluates its contractors on
whether they enforce their coverage determinations-or that CMS would even
have the resources to do so. 1 7 3
These enforcement challenges help to explain why a recent study comparing
the effects of conditional LCDs across different geographic regions concluded
that "coverage policies alone can, but generally do not, impact provider behav-
ior."17 4 Although there has been no systematic research on national coverage
determinations, there is suggestive evidence that Medicare contractors do not
reliably enforce NCDs either. For just one example, Medicare purports not to
cover colonoscopies within ten years of a prior colonoscopy that revealed no
abnormalities. Yet Medicare contractors deny only about two percent of claims
for inappropriate, repeat colonoscopies.
Second, because CMS lacks clear statutory authority to consider costs, the
coverage determinations that Medicare's contractors are supposed to enforce are
cost blind. Even if the coverage determinations were adhered to, Medicare's
physicians would only avoid medical interventions of no proven value. As far as
Medicare is concerned, where two treatments have been shown to be equally
effective, physicians remain free to choose the more expensive one.
Nor is Medicare's cost-blind posture likely to change anytime soon. Read in
isolation, the Medicare statute's exclusion of items and services that are "not
reasonable and necessary" is ambiguous-it's plausible that care is both "reason-
170. See Garber, supra note 163, at 1305.
171. See supra section II.A.2.
172. See Foote et al., supra note 164, at 1300.
173. See Redacted Benchmark Metric Reports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.
cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/MedicareContractingReform/RedactedBenchmarkMetric
Reports.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (providing spreadsheets of contracting benchmarks, none of
which mention LCDs).
174. See Foote et al., supra note 164, at 1299.
175. See James S. Goodwin et al., Overuse of Screening Colonoscopy in the Medicare Population,
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1335, 1342 (2011).
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able and necessary" whenever it confers a medical benefit, regardless of cost;
it's also plausible that expensive care of limited marginal benefit is neither
reasonable nor necessary. CMS remains convinced that it could, per Chevron,17 6
resolve that ambiguity to authorize the consideration of costs in passing on the
scope of Medicare coverage.177 To date, however, it has chosen not to.
Any such interpretation would be legally vulnerable. Read in context, the
Medicare statute excludes coverage for "any expenses incurred for items or
services ... which .. . are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury."17 8 The "reasonable and necessary" clause immedi-
ately follows and thus appears to modify "items and services," not "ex-
penses."17 9 With that in mind, the textual connection between "reasonable and
necessary" and "the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury" suggests that
reasonableness and necessity are to be gauged mainly with reference to an item
or service's medical benefit.180 Confirming the point, subsequent subparagraphs
that lack a reference to "expenses" link the same "reasonable and necessary"
clause to "items and services" and their use in the "prevention of illness" 81
not to any assessment of cost.
Inferences from the Medicare statute's structure lend further support to the
conclusion that the scope of coverage was to be cost blind. When Medicare was
enacted in 1965, many payments, including hospital payments, were keyed to
the "reasonable cost" of the service provided. 18 2 At the time, this was under-
stood to authorize Medicare's fiscal intermediaries to deny payment for costs
they deemed unreasonable. Yet the explicit conferral of authority on intermediar-
ies to consider the cost of medical treatment finds no counterpart in the
Medicare statute's mandate to cover all "reasonable and necessary" medical
care. This is arguably suggestive. In Whitman v. American Trucking Association,
the Supreme Court "refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the [Clean
Air Act] an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often,
been expressly granted." 1 8 3 The same could be said about the Medicare statute.
176. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that,
where a statute is ambiguous, the courts will defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged
with its implementation).
177. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4, Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(No. 08-5508).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006).
179. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (discussing "the rule of the last antecedent").
180. The "reasonable and necessary" phrase was lifted from an Aetna insurance policy contract,
apparently on the understanding that it imposed no meaningful check on treatment decisions. See Fox,
supra note 13, at 593-94.
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(B) (providing that "in the case of items and services
described [elsewhere], which are not reasonable and necessary for the prevention of illness").
182. 1965 Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1814(b), 79 Stat. 294 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1359 (2006)).
183. See 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001). But see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222
(2009) (rejecting the argument that "the mere fact" that the Clean Water Act "does not expressly
552 [Vol. 101:519
WHY MEDICARE REFORM HASN'T WORKED
To be sure, it would do no particular violence to English usage to say that an
item or service is not "reasonable ... for the diagnosis or treatment or illness or
injury" because it's too expensive. But that's probably not the most natural
reading of the statute, and in any event, courts might balk at a CMS interpreta-
tion that empowered it to ration care. The enacting Congress's painstaking
efforts to avoid interfering in physician treatment decisions, Congress's refusal
in the forty-eight years since to explicitly authorize the consideration of costs,
and a deep societal distaste for government rationing all lend considerable force
to the intuition that Congress has never authorized Medicare to consider cost in
making coverage determinations.184
Whatever the ultimate outcome in litigation, the critical point is that CMS
would face a serious court challenge were it to insert cost into coverage
determinations. Why invite such a test of its authority? Three prior agency
efforts to allow for the consideration of costs have incited political resistance
that was too formidable for the bureaucracy to withstand. CMS would be
foolish to squander scarce agency resources on a politically fractious rulemak-
ing that, even if successful, would stand a decent chance of judicial invalidation-
or, failing that, of reversal by a Congress concerned that CMS had arrogated to
itself authority to ration care.
In practice, then, the agency is incapable of considering costs in issuing
coverage determinations. From the perspective of encouraging physicians to
practice cost-conscious care, this is problematic. Not only must Medicare
devote taxpayer dollars to expensive treatments that offer no greater health
benefit than cheaper alternatives, worse still, as Einer Elhauge has pointed out,
Medicare's cost blindness encourages the development and adoption of expen-
sive treatments that offer only trivial health benefits over cheaper alterna-
tives.18 5
Third, CMS has no gate-keeping authority to insist that physicians and
hospitals demonstrate the efficacy of a new treatment through scientific trials.
(FDA does have such authority, which goes some distance to explaining its
power when compared to the weak CMS.) 18 6 Yet the agency lacks the resources
to investigate those technologies and services for which the available evidence
is lacking. And so, in the rare case that CMS does issue an NCD, the evidence
authorize cost-benefit analysis for [one] test, though it does so for two of the other tests, displays an
intent to forbid its use").
184. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("In extraordinary
cases, ... there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended ... an implicit
delegation [of authority to fill a statutory gap]."). For a discussion of the so-called "major questions"
exception to Chevron deference, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236-42
(2006).
185. See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAU. L. REv. 1449, 1471 (1994).
186. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POwER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEU-
TICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (offering exhaustive account of FDA's use of gate-keeping
authority to augment its power).
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upon which it bases its coverage determination is usually of poor quality."s'
Even then, the agency's focus on medical innovations only scratches the surface
of the problem. Researchers estimate that only between ten and twenty percent
of the therapies in widespread use have ever been subjected to careful analysis
of their safety and efficacy.188 Without conscientious review of older therapies,
Medicare coverage determinations can do little to nudge physicians to practice
cost-conscious, high-quality care.
Medicare's tentative efforts to limit the diffusion of wasteful medical technol-
ogy have come to naught. The program relies on woefully inadequate outside
contractors to police conformity with coverage limitations. It is unable to
consider costs in deciding what to cover. And it lacks the resources to evaluate
novel medical technology. Taken together, these factors have hobbled Medi-
care's efforts to influence physicians' use of costly medical technologies of
limited or uncertain benefit.
III. How To THINK ABOUT MEDICARE REFORM
If Medicare reform has persistently failed to align physician practice patterns
with federal priorities, what are we to make of that? One plausible response is:
not much. The instinct to shrug could come from at least three sources. First, the
pattern of failure may reflect a kind of backhanded success. Perhaps Congress's
inattention and persistent refusal to rethink Medicare's structure reflects a
deep-seated cultural view that, although cost control and quality improvement
would be nice, they aren't important enough to warrant government meddling in
the physician-patient relationship.
Second, it's possible that Medicare reform, however thoughtfully crafted, is
destined to fail. All countries in the developed world have struggled to constrain
rising health expenditures and to address persistent quality concerns. 189 Maybe
no government program stands a chance. Plus, Medicare is only one payer
among many, covering just one-fifth of medical spending in the country. 190 How
much leverage over physicians can it expect to have?
Third, perhaps the reforms were unnecessary and unwise to begin with.
Better that private payers-employers and insurers-take the lead in reshaping
how physicians practice medicine. Private payers will calibrate their efforts with
187. See Neumann et al., supra note 167, at 1623 (finding that "CMS considered the evidence only
fair or poor for most of the technologies evaluated since 1999").
188. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-608, IDENIFYING HEALTH TECHNOLO-
GIES THAT WORK: SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE 21 (1994).
189. See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNoMIc Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), HEALTH AT A GLANCE
2011, at 9, 104-28 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/49105858.pdf
(reporting that medical spending in OECD countries has outpaced GDP growth and that quality of care
is highly variable).
190. See KAISER FAMILx FouND., supra note 51.
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reference to what the market demands, not cater to confused and ambivalent
public opinion about the "right" amount of medical spending or the "right" level
of investment in quality improvement. Given the risk of unintended conse-
quences arising from government intervention, Medicare should be the inciden-
tal beneficiary of private-market reforms, not the other way round.
Yet a shrug is not in order. A complete response to these objections is that
Medicare reform is coming. However uncommitted Congress may have been to
meaningful reform in the past, however unlikely that Medicare reform will
succeed, and however unnecessary or unwise governmental intervention may
be, it's still coming. Absent a revolutionary willingness on the part of the
American public to accept a much higher tax burden, a far greater share of
medical costs, or indiscriminate Medicare cuts, the federal government cannot
long continue to bear ever-increasing Medicare expenditures. If reform is in the
offing, its success will depend on whether it enables the assertion of control
over the physicians that implement the program at the bedside.
None of this is to deny the imperative that physicians retain discretion to
practice medicine in line with their professional judgments. The staggering
complexity of medicine cannot be reduced to simple formulas, especially for
those Medicare patients that suffer from chronic conditions and multiple comor-
bidities. In addition, responsible medical practice demands sensitivity to patient
desires and the exercise of considerable human judgment when patients are
confused or uncertain about what they want. Discretion is part of what physi-
cians do.
This discretion also serves a critical legitimation function.19 1 The centrality
of discretion to the legitimacy of intervention in the physician-patient relation-
ship was on vivid display in the collapse of the managed-care revolution of the
late 1990s, where patients rebelled against insurers that, in their efforts to
restrain medical spending, were thought to have trenched too far on physician
discretion. 19 2 Physician discretion is the linchpin of Medicare's legitimacy and
popularity. 19 3 The challenge is to preserve Medicare's legitimacy by channeling
physician discretion in a clinically sensitive manner-one that both physicians
and beneficiaries accept, if sometimes grudgingly. On this front, Troyen Bren-
nan and Donald Berwick's central lesson about health-care regulation is apt:
that its legitimacy and effectiveness depend on whether it engages physicians in
a cooperative enterprise.194
191. See LIPSKY, supra note 6, at 15 ("For both workers and clients, maintenance of discretion
contributes to the legitimacy of the welfare-service state.").
192. See Robinson, supra note 146 (arguing that managed care "can be characterized as a partial
economic success and total political failure").
193. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
437, 448-49 (2003) (noting that "government-stakeholder network structures" are adopted for a variety
of reasons, among them "tapping the knowledge and experience of these constituencies, and securing
their participation in more effective implementation of an agency's policies").
194. See BRENNAN & BERWICK, supra note 90, at 28.
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Reforming Medicare to enable the assertion of control over physician behav-
ior is all the more difficult because Congress still has only a limited range of
action available to it. The same constraints that influenced its choice of reform
policy in the past-stiff public resistance to governmental interference in
medical practice, an immovable commitment to the public financing of private
care, and a deep reluctance to expand the size and power of the federal
bureaucracy-all remain in place.
It's worth identifying what that takes off the table. The creation of a new
government bureaucracy directly responsible for providing medical care-
socialized medicine along the lines of Britain's National Health Service-is not
a politically plausible option. No more realistic is a monumental expansion of
the resources and authority of CMS. Even if the political branches could
overcome visceral public antipathy toward the expansion of the federal govern-
ment, it's far from obvious that legions of federal functionaries could success-
fully monitor and adjust the practice patterns of hundreds of thousands of
scattered physicians. Even if they could, Medicare's very legitimacy would be
threatened by such an assertive effort to salvage the program.
What's left? Physicians have long functioned as Medicare's bedside bureau-
crats, albeit with so few trappings of bureaucracy that it escapes conscious
notice. If Medicare cannot depend on the rules and hierarchies of classic
Weberian bureaucracies to manage this vast network of private physicians, then
it must-as it has before-turn to private organizations to do the job for it. 19 5
Medicare must, in other words, bring bureaucracy to its bureaucrats. Enlisting
third-party organizations thus offers a kind of privatized Weberian solution to
Medicare's accountability and management troubles.1 9 6
Medicare's unhappy reform history suggests just how challenging this will
be. The list of groups that have been tapped to reshape physician practice
patterns is long-peer review organizations, hospitals, medical societies, man-
aged-care organizations, and the insurers that process Medicare claims-but the
list of successes is short. Encouragingly, however, bureaucracies with a proven
track record of managing physicians-known variously as integrated delivery
systems, integrated hospital systems, and multispecialty group practices-do
exist. For one celebrated example, take Kaiser Permanente in California. Kaiser
provides comprehensive care to its patients in exchange for a prepaid fee;
patients in turn are restricted to Kaiser hospitals and Kaiser physicians, giving
195. See Kettl, supra note 63, at 493 (observing that government officials "must find tools to
influence the behavior of frontline service providers who work in other organizations").
196. To put it somewhat differently, enabling private organizations to better control physicians
would function as a workaround. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. Cm. L. REV.
717, 719 (2010) (defining "workarounds" as "government contracts ... that provide the outsourcing
agency with the means of achieving distinct public policy goals that ... would be impossible or much
more difficult to attain in the ordinary course of nonprivatized public administration").
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the organization a financial interest in keeping medical costs low by coordinat-
ing patient care. In part because its physicians are salaried employees, Kaiser
has the leverage to ensure that its physicians practice medicine consistently with
organizational priorities. Kaiser has in turn developed a culture that values
collaboration, adherence to practice guidelines, and cost-conscious medicine.
Other integrated medical systems-including the Geisinger Health System in
Pennsylvania, Intermountain Healthcare in Utah, and the Mayo Clinic in Minne-
sota-offer similar success stories. 197 As the Dartmouth Atlas studies have
exhaustively documented, these organizations consistently offer their Medicare
beneficiaries high-quality care at relatively low cost.198 Organized systems
perform particularly well when it comes to treating those suffering from chronic
conditions. Although providing effective chronic care demands close coopera-
tion between disparate providers, the current approach, as Elhauge puts it,
"couples the mother of all team production problems with the mother of all
refusals to use centralized ownership structures to solve them." 199 Organized
medical systems have the potential to create the structures, provide the incen-
tives, and institute the routines necessary to shift Medicare's focus away from
acute care and toward the treatment of chronic conditions.2 0 0
The notion that Medicare needs more organizational bureaucracy may have a
somewhat dystopian ring to it. But bureaucracy does not necessarily imply
endless red tape, rigid rules, or insensitivity to patient needs. The challenge is to
honor physicians' need for clinical autonomy while at the same time protecting
organizational (and, by extension, governmental) priorities. Existing care organi-
zations have developed a variety of techniques to meet that challenge. At
Intermountain, for example, committees of physicians and nurses have devel-
oped dozens of treatment protocols for relatively common conditions based on a
mix of medical evidence, common practices, and informed guesswork. Distrib-
uted throughout the organization, these protocols become default treatment
options. Although physicians can easily deviate from these defaults, they do so
infrequently, and the protocols have both reduced treatment variation (usually
by reducing care intensity) and improved quality of care.20 1 Other organized
systems have rolled out "checklists" to guide physicians and nurses in carrying
out routine treatments. Some of these checklists have been shown to dramati-
cally improve care quality without materially infringing on physician discretion
in complex cases.2 02 Still others, including Geisinger, have successfully experi-
197. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 13 (discussing the systems).
198. See id. at 167 (documenting "an association between organized care, higher technical quality,
and lower care intensity").
199. Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation, in THE FRAGMENTATION
OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 7 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
200. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 164-68.
201. See David Leonhardt, Making Health Care Better, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Nov. 3, 2009, at MM31.
202. See Peter Pronovost et al., An Intervention To Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infec-
tions in the ICU, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2725, 2726-31 (2006).
2013] 557
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
mented with payment models that reward physicians for providing efficient,
high-quality care.2 03
The point is not that these are ideal models of physician control. It's that
organized systems bent on adjusting how their physicians practice medicine can
successfully rebalance the interests of physicians, patients, and payers without
surrendering their legitimacy. In this, they offer a contrast to the managed-care
organizations of the late 1990s whose heavy-handed tactics alienated physicians
and patients alike.2 0 4 Perhaps health-care systems with patient care, and not
actuarial tables, in their organizational DNA could improve on insurers' perfor-
mance.
The attractiveness of using integrated systems of medical care as a model for
reform has not gone unnoticed. John Wennberg and Alain Enthoven, for just
two prominent examples, have both argued that organized health-care systems
are key to reducing spending on unnecessary treatments and improving qual-
ity.205 The refrain, however, is often followed by a lament that few successful
organized systems exist and that we don't know how to foster their develop-
ment.2 06 However much Congress would like to put integrated delivery systems
at the center of the program-to contract directly with them for the delivery of
care instead of with a distributed network of physicians-there are not enough
to go around.207
What's more, the integrated systems that do exist face perverse incentives:
reductions in care intensity lead to a reduction in their fee-for-service payments.
Intermountain's successful efforts to reduce service intensity and improve
quality, for example, have proven "financially destabilizing."20 8 In the early
2000s, the Mayo Clinic billed Medicare an average of $53,432 for each
chronically ill patient over the patient's last two years of life. The UCLA
Medical Center, by contrast, billed $93,842.209 Similar variations exist across
the country and are not explained by differences in the health status of those
203. See Thomas H. Lee et al., How Geisinger Structures Its Physicians' Compensation To Support
Improvements in Quality, Efficiency, and Volume, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2068, 2068 (2012).
204. See SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY Too MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING Us SICKER AND
POORER 245 (2007) (observing that managed care plans "borrowed the cost-control policies from the
true HMOs [in other words, prepaid group plans], while ignoring the need for doctors who were
committed to a new way of practicing medicine").
205. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 12; see also Alain Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with
Integrated Delivery Systems, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS, supra
note 199, at 61.
206. See, e.g., Austin B. Frakt & Rick Mayes, Beyond Capitation: How New Payment Experiments
Seek To Find the 'Sweet Spot' in Amount of Risk Providers and Payers Bear, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1951, 1955
(2012) ("An unanswered question is how [organizations like Geisinger and Kaiser] can be successfully
replicated.").
207. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 12 ("The bad news is that the United States does not have
enough of them.").
208. Id. at 220.
209. See id. at 172.
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receiving treatment. What possible financial incentive does UCLA have to look
more like Mayo?
This dearth of appropriate contractors, however, is not at all unusual for
government programs. Where the market doesn't offer what the government
needs, the government must motivate the market to do so. 2 1 0 In the past,
Medicare itself has deliberately and successfully stimulated market innovation:
the enactment of Part D spurred the rapid proliferation of previously unknown
stand-alone drug plans.211 Some measure of greater integration is happening
already as more and more physicians leave private practice to join larger
medical organizations.21 2 The task of Medicare reform is to capitalize on this
emerging trend and accelerate the development of organized systems of medical
care that have the financial incentives, institutional capacities, and societal
legitimacy to change how physicians practice medicine.
How should it be managed? Drawing on the lessons of Medicare's history of
failed reform-and saving for Part IV a full evaluation of the Medicare reforms
included in the ACA-I argue that Medicare must move to bundled payments,
key those payments to what efficient providers spend to provide medical care,
and allow for greater restrictions on patient choice of physician. Medicare must
also be given the resources necessary to monitor and manage the organized
systems of care that would be at the center of Medicare administration. Taken
together, these changes would promote the development of organizations that
could successfully encourage their physicians to practice cost-conscious, high-
quality care.
A. BUNDLING
To accelerate a shift toward organized systems, Medicare must move away
from separately paying hospitals and physicians for discrete interventions. It
must instead embrace lump-sum payments that go not to individual physicians,
but to organizations that would in turn enter into private arrangements with care
providers, including physicians, to distribute the Medicare payments. Those
payments could be keyed to a single intervention (like a hip replacement), an
episode of care (an acute care stay plus postinpatient treatment for sixty days),
or to an individual beneficiary (capitation or global payments). Whatever its
precise shape, however, Medicare must pay for care in much bigger bundles.2 13
Bundled payments are in some sense already at the core of traditional
Medicare. The prospective payment system for inpatient hospitalizations offers
210. See Kettl, supra note 63, at 496 (arguing that government's burden is to "stimulate the market
to produce goods and services that otherwise would not be produced").
211. See MORGAN & CAMPBELL supra note 20, at 159 (noting that one indication of Part D's success
"is that a market of stand-alone drug plans came into being at all").
212. See Gardiner Harris, More Doctors Giving Up Private Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health/policy/26docs.html.
213. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Saving by the Bundle, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/11/16/saving-by-the-bundle/ (endorsing bundled payments).
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hospitals a lump sum-a bundle-to cover the costs of a particular episode of
care. Alone among Medicare's reforms, prospective payment has successfully
moderated cost growth while maintaining, or at least not much diminishing,
quality of care. Nothing else has worked nearly as well. The lesson appears
straightforward: if Medicare wants its agents to act as if they faced resource
constraints, Medicare must constrain their resources. And if the primary flaw of
the prospective-payment system is that it excludes physician services from
DRG payments, a shift to true bundled payments would remedy that defect.
On a smaller scale, Medicare has had some provisional success with true
bundled payments. In a demonstration project carried out from 1991 to 1996,
HCFA dubbed seven hospitals "Centers of Excellence" for coronary artery
bypass graft (CABG) surgery and offered those Centers a lump sum per CABG
surgery that would then be distributed between the hospitals and their affiliated
physicians. As MedPAC explained, "with a global payment for hospital and
physician services, the hospital can restructure physicians' payment to give
them the financial incentive to be more cost efficient."2 14 The Centers of
Excellence cut CABG costs by ten percent, even as they reduced mortality.2 15
Apart from the prospective payment system, Medicare Advantage stands as
Medicare's most elaborate experiment with bundled (specifically, capitated)
payments. Insurers, however, operate at a disadvantage relative to organized
medical systems when it comes to recruiting private physicians in a cooperative
push to constrain spending and improve quality. The theory of the firm offers
some insight here. As Ronald Coase famously explained, a firm will prefer to
produce a good or service itself when the transaction costs of securing that good
or service on the open market are higher than the agency costs incurred in
producing the good or service internally. 216 Extraordinary transaction costs
hamper insurers' efforts to purchase a complex basket of low-cost, high-quality
medical services on the open market.2 17 The internal production of medical
services (or a subset of such services) within organized systems of care may
prove superior to market forces in reducing unit costs. Organized systems are
much closer to the physicians that practice within them and much better
positioned to establish the internal procedures, monitoring tools, and organiza-
tional culture that could successfully reshape how physicians practice medi-
cine. 2 18 Yet a variety of financial and regulatory obstacles-including the
absence of true competitive pressures in Medicare Advantage and physician
214. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGREsS: VAUATION AND INNOVATION IN
MEDICARE 140 (2003).
215. See id. at 140-41.
216. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33-55 (1988).
217. See JAMES ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 106 (1999) ("[I]insurers have only
meager resources at their disposal to influence the physicians' style of practice.").
218. See Theodore W. Ruger, Plural Constitutionalism and the Pathologies of American Health
Care, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347, 364 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/
legislation/plural-constitutionalism-and-the-pathologies-of-american-health-care/ ("By enlisting (or con-
scripting) individual treating physicians in the cost-control enterprise, payment reform does not unsettle
560 [Vol. 101:519
WHY MEDICARE REFORM HASN'T WORKED
disinclination to relinquish private practice 219-have impeded efforts to bring
production in-house.2 20
Enlarging bundled payments to include physician services would remove a
significant obstacle to the in-house production of medical services. As it stands,
Medicare is sufficiently generous that an average physician seeing only Medi-
care patients would still make roughly $240,000 in take-home pay each year.2 21
Small wonder that ninety-six percent of the nation's physicians participate and
that many are reluctant to relinquish independent practice.2 22 A shift to bundled
payments, especially if complemented by cuts in physician payments for those
complex treatments or chronic episodes of care that ought to be provided in
integrated systems, would encourage more physicians to abandon the relative
freedom of private practice for the constraints of institutional affiliation.
Bringing physicians in-house would mean that health-care organizations
would have an acute financial incentive to assure that their physicians avoid
wasteful and expensive care. Competition between such systems would favor
those organizations that could effectively manage their physicians. Embedding
physicians in organized systems of care would also erode the artificial divide
between Parts A and B, a divide that perpetuates the fragmentation of the
health-care system and impedes care coordination for the elderly and disabled
beneficiaries whose chronic conditions demand comprehensive management.
On the quality side, mandatory bundling could invigorate Medicare's nascent
pay-for-performance initiatives. 223 Under such initiatives, payments are in-
creased in connection with adherence to clinical guidelines, reductions in
unnecessary care, avoidance of errors, and improved patient outcomes. Al-
though the early returns on pay-for-performance initiatives are uninspiring, 2 2 4
Medicare has charged ahead. In 2008, CMS launched its first program wide
pay-for-performance scheme and eliminated payments to inpatient hospitals for
ten preventable hospital-acquired conditions.22 5 The ACA includes two addi-
the longstanding form of the treatment interaction in the way that direct managed care utilization
review did, even as it shifts key incentives behind the scenes.").
219. See supra section II.C.2.
220. Elhauge, supra note 199, at 10 (arguing that "the current organizational structures are not the
result of free market forces, but rather are dictated by a complex set of laws that prevent different
organizational forms from being used").
221. See ROBERT BERENSON ET AL., WHAT IF ALL PHYSICIAN SERVICES WERE PAID UNDER THE MEDICARE
FEE SCHEDULE? AN ANALYSIS USING MEDICAL GROUP MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION DATA 13-14 (2010).
222. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 51.
223. See generally INST. OF MED., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN
MEDICARE (2007) (embracing pay-for-performance initiatives); see also DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY
OR YOUR LIFE 100-13 (2004) (same).
224. See Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance-Emerging Models of Provider-
Payment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197 (2008) (noting that pay-for-performance initiatives
have shown "somewhat lackluster early results" and are "characterized by some as putting lipstick on a
pig").
225. See 72 Fed. Reg. 47130, 47200-18 (Aug. 22, 2007); see also Grace M. Lee et al., Effect of
Nonpayment for Preventable Infections in U.S. Hospitals, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428, 1434 (2012)
(reporting disappointing results for CMS program).
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tional pay-for-performance initiatives: one that cuts Medicare payments for
hospitals with high rates of readmission,22 6 and another that distributes a pool of
money to hospitals according to their relative performance on twelve clinical-
care measures. 2 2 7
Offering bundled payments to organized health-care systems could put these
pay-for-performance efforts on a better footing. Intractable questions of measure-
ment and assignment foreclose pay-for-performance initiatives targeted directly
at Medicare's physicians. 228 The second best option-and the one that CMS has
gravitated to-is to pay for performance at institutions, usually hospitals. But
this means that Medicare ignores medical care outside hospitals, a striking
oversight given the large amount of care (particularly care for chronic condi-
tions) offered in noninstitutional settings. Nor is it obvious that paying for
performance at the hospital level will reliably adjust physician practice pat-
terns.2 2 9 Hospitals often lack much influence over physicians' treatment deci-
sions. Integrated health-care organizations are much better positioned to
encourage physicians to attend to quality concerns.
Bundling may even allow Medicare to use competitive bidding to improve
the efficiency and quality of the services for which it pays. David Hyman, for
one, wonders why "almost no one has asked why the form of price setting used
by the government in other parts of procurement (competitive bidding) is
effectively nonexistent in Medicare."2 30 Part of the answer is structural. To date,
Medicare has embraced competitive bidding only for durable medical equip-
ment-where the market is vibrant and where holding a manageable number of
national competitions could yield large programmatic savings. 231 These condi-
tions are altogether absent for traditional Medicare, where an insistence on
paying separately for individual physician services would make competitive
bidding impossibly cumbersome. Bundled payments, however, could perhaps
facilitate competition between organized systems for the opportunity to cover
services arising from discrete episodes of care.232
226. See ACA, § 3025, amended by Reconciliation Act, § 10309.
227. See id. § 1886(o) (establishing the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program); 76 Fed. Reg.
2454, 2481-83 (Jan. 13, 2011) (discussing method of payment distribution).
228. See Karen Milgate & Sharon Bee Cheng, Pay-For-Performance: The MedPAC Perspective, 25
HEALTH AF. 413, 416-17 (2006) (noting that paying physicians for performance is challenging
"because of the lack of a data infrastructure, the wide variety of specialties, and the sheer number of
physicians").
229. See Andrew Ryan & Jan Blustein, Making the Best of Hospital Pay for Performance, 366 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1559 (2012) (noting that "we know little about how information about financial
incentives is processed in the 'nervous system' of hospitals, how that knowledge is transmitted to the
appropriate actors, or how actors mount effective responses").
230. HYMAN, supra note 15, at 22.
231. See Robert F. Coulam et al., Competitive Pricing and the Challenge of Cost Control in
Medicare, 36 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 649, 657 (2011) (citing "reports from the initial round of DME
rebidding show the possibility of substantial savings-the average savings across all product categories
was 32 percent").
232. See id. at 651 (observing that competitive bidding could work in principle "[flor health plan
premiums and other plausible items or bundles of health care services").
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B. BENCHMARKING
Because at least half the cost growth in health care can be chalked up to
medical technology, any plausible Medicare reform must somehow check the
propensity of physicians to adopt expensive treatments of little or no proven
value. Top-down efforts to use coverage policy to forestall the adoption of
unproven medical technology have proven ineffective; no agency or organiza-
tion can plausibly monitor hundreds of thousands of physicians to assure
compliance with thousands of coverage policies. Nor has the prospective pay-
ment system successfully slowed the adoption of new medical technology. By
statute, Medicare is committed to reimbursing providers for the reasonable costs
of their chosen treatment. Accordingly, when it sets prices under the prospective
payment system-whether through DRGs or the fee schedule-Medicare at-
tempts to reimburse providers for the median cost of providing medically
necessary care to a representative patient.233 As a result, prospective payment
rates increase as new technologies are adopted, even if those technologies are
expensive and offer no proven benefits over alternatives. For just one example,
more and more hospitals are using proton-beam therapy to treat prostate cancer,
even though it has not been shown to be more effective than conventional
treatments and installing the proton-beam facilities can cost up to $100 mil-
lion.234 From a fiscal perspective, this is problematic.
Paying in bundles could help. If an organization is paid a flat rate and can
achieve equivalent results with cheaper technology, it will likely opt for the less
expensive alternative.2 35 Experience in Britain is instructive. The National
Health Service's relative success in managing the use of expensive medical
technology has much to do with its fixed national budget for health-care expenditures.
Around three-quarters of that national budget is distributed to roughly 150
regional boards known as "Primary Care Trusts." Those trusts in turn allocate
the funds among general practitioners and hospitals, which employ specialist
physicians.2 36 General practitioners and hospitals must then stretch their allo-
cated resources to cover patient care, forcing difficult, but necessary, tradeoffs
between investments in new technology and other costs (additional personnel,
new facilities, etc.). 2 3 7 As Henry Aaron, William Schwartz, and Melissa Cox
have described, providers in resource constrained systems must harmonize their
professional obligations with their role as "society's agents" in dispensing
233. See supra section II.B.1.
234. See Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan S. Skinner, Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in
Health Care 28 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16953, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6953.
235. See Ehauge, supra note 112, at 1526 (observing that "any shift to cost-sensitive means of
financing and providing health care decreases, not increases, the need to restrict the entry of expensive
new technologies").
236. See HENRY J. AARON, WLLIAM B. SCHWARTZ & MELISSA COX, CAN WE SAY No? THE CHALLENGE
OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 19-20 (2005).
237. See id. at 30-92 (documenting how budget constraints have shaped the British health-care
system).
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medical benefits. 238 Although professional and social obligations may clash, the
NHS has retained its legitimacy by shifting decisions of how to most effectively
allocate scarce resources onto the medical community. Medicare could stand to
do the same.23 9
But how big should the bundled payments be? If the Medicare statute
continues to require coverage of the costs of marginally beneficial treatments,
pressure will inevitably build to expand the size of the bundles to cover
expensive treatments of dubious value. Assured of continuing increases in
bundled payments, organized health-care systems have inadequate incentives to
avoid useless new treatments. To discipline these systems, Congress should
relax Medicare's statutory commitment to covering a median provider's reason-
able costs. After all, current costs are artifacts of a system that encourages the
overprovision of supply-sensitive care. Instead, bundled payments should be set
with reference to the costs that low-cost benchmark organizations spend to
cover the costs of medically necessary care (per patient or per episode of care).
Any shift to benchmark payments should be gradual; as Stuart Altman has
emphasized, precipitate cuts might be politically unsustainable, and the impor-
tant point at the outset is to force major changes in care management.2 40 Over
time, however, falling reimbursement would put immense pressure on organized
systems to learn from benchmark organizations how to encourage their physi-
cians to practice cost-conscious care-or to innovate their own solutions.
On this model, Medicare would no longer make coverage determinations. It
would instead set bundled payments with an eye to established best practices.
Medicare has tried a similar tactic before: for a brief period, it employed a
pricing strategy for durable medical equipment and some drugs known as the
"least costly alternative," under which Medicare payment was set with reference
not to the item in question, but to the least costly item that would achieve
comparable clinical results. 2 41 The policy was abandoned, however, when the
D.C. Circuit held that it violated the Medicare statute.2 42
All of which raises an important and provocative question. Should organiza-
tions receiving bundled payments have the legal latitude to deny care deemed
insufficiently cost-effective? Should they, in other words, be empowered to
ration care? At least in the short-to-medium term, winnowing out medical
treatments that provide no demonstrated benefit may be sufficient to stave off
238. Id. at 102.
239. See Lester M. Salamon, The Tools Approach and the New Governance: Conclusion and
Implications, in THE TOOLS OF GovERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 602
(observing that private organizations may "offer an added measure of legitimacy to public action by
engaging a number of other institutions in public work").
240. See Stuart H. Altman, The Lessons of Medicare's Prospective Payment System Show that the
Bundled Payment Program Faces Challenges, 31 HEALTH. AFF. 1923, 1926 (2012).
241. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 6 (2010).
242. Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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stratospheric cost escalation.243 In the long run, however, Congress may need to
explore relieving health-care organizations of their obligations (under both state
and federal law) to provide cost-ineffective care.
C. SORTING
Part of the original Medicare deal was that all licensed physicians would be
eligible to receive Medicare reimbursement and that all beneficiaries would
have their free choice of physician.24 4 As a result, in the words of one former
acting administrator of CMS, "the worst physician in America can participate in
[Medicare]-and probably does, in fact." 2 4 5 In a number of ways, this has
complicated the development of those organized, integrated health-care systems
that could exert control over the practice patterns of physicians. Assured of their
continued participation in Medicare, physicians are often reluctant to surrender
their autonomy. Those that do join integrated systems can credibly threaten to
leave if efforts to shift their practice patterns are thought too onerous. And
because patients can seek care from anyone, integrated systems have limited
capacity to direct patients to those physicians over whom the systems have
some measure of control.
Repeated calls from lawmakers246 and commentators 247 to empower CMS to
favor efficient, high-quality providers have gone nowhere. In an important 2007
report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) joined the chorus and
concluded that CMS could reduce spending growth were it to profile physicians
and avoid outlier physicians with remarkably high costs. 2 4 8 Yet GAO noted that
Medicare appears to lack statutory authority to "designate preferred providers,
assign physicians to tiers associated with varying beneficiary copayments, tie
fee updates of individual physicians to meeting performance standards, or
exclude physicians who do not meet practice efficiency and quality criteria." 2 4 9
The problem, however, runs deeper than GAO imagines. An ingrained and
intense distrust of government power-particularly in the health-care field-
likely precludes giving CMS the authority and resources it would need to
243. See WENNBERG, supra note 12, at 4 ("[C]ontrolling costs will not necessarily require ration-
ing-if by 'rationing' we mean the withholding of care that patients want, and that is effective in
improving outcomes.").
244. See supra section I.D.
245. John K. Iglehart, Doing More with Less: A Conversation with Kerry Weems, 28 HEALTH AFF.
w688, w694 (2009).
246. See, e.g., Medicare Value-Based Purchasing for Physicians' Services Act of 2005, H.R. 3617,
109th Cong. (2005) (proposed bill).
247. See, e.g., LYNN ETHEREDGE, REENGINEERING MEDICARE: FROM BILL-PAYING INSURER TO AccouNT-
ABLE PURCHASER 7 (1995) (arguing that "Medicare needs the authority to select providers based on
quantifiable measures of quality, outcomes, and service" (emphasis omitted)); Robert A. Berenson &
Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional Medicare-Should We? Could We?, 65 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-49 (2002) (suggesting use of selective contracting in Medicare).
248. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-307, MEDICARE: Focus oN PHYSICIAN PRACTICE
PATTERNS CAN LEAD TO GREATER PROGRAM EFFCIENCY 21 (2007).
249. Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted).
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evaluate its physicians, much less to then tier them or exclude large numbers of
them. 2 5 0 The trick, again, is to accelerate the development of third-party organi-
zations that can do what Medicare cannot: direct beneficiaries to efficient,
high-quality physicians. Medicare Advantage plans have already assumed that
responsibility and-in a marked deviation from the Medicare statute's bedrock
commitments to universal physician participation and free patient choice-can
tailor their provider networks as they deem appropriate. The Medicare statute
should be revised along similar lines to condition coverage on staying within
integrated medical systems for the entire episode of care that a bundled payment
covers.
D. MANAGING
To ease the development of risk-bearing organized systems, Medicare's core
task would have to shift away from assuring the prompt processing of claims.
The agency would instead have to learn to manage a network of private
risk-bearing entities, guarantee that these actors provide high-quality care even
as financial incentives tempt them to cut corners, and respond to the inevitable
concerns that arise from asking private, risk-bearing entities to assume a
position of greater clinical authority over physicians.
As the dismal history of Medicare reform suggests, CMS is not remotely up
to the task. In 1975, almost $5 out of every $100 that Medicare reimbursed was
spent on administration, and it was still thought to be underresourced. By 2009,
that number had dropped to $1.10.251 And so, with a staff about the same size as
that of the Smithsonian Institution, CMS oversees distribution of a Medicare
budget that exceeds the size of Argentina's economy. 2 5 2 To call the agency
beleaguered would be an adventure in understatement. In an open letter to
Congress and the President in 1999, two former Medicare administrators and a
raft of Medicare experts observed that "many of the difficulties that threaten to
cripple [then-HCFA, now-CMS] stem from an unwillingness ... to provide the
agency the resources and administrative flexibility necessary to carry out its
mammoth assignment." 2 5 3 Medicare's low administrative costs are not the
unalloyed good they are sometimes taken to be: 2 54 sometimes, you get what you
pay for.
250. See MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 226-27 (arguing that one of the "basic parameters
of American politics" is "that the public wants the government to cushion them from a host of social
risks, but that this should be achieved by minimizing the direct role of government").
251. See KAISER FAMILY FoUND., supra note 51, at 80.
252. See Payton, supra note 15, at 124 (noting that "CMS has fewer than five thousand full-time
equivalent employees, many fewer than required to perform competently the core functions assigned
directly to it"); see also U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT STAlTIcs, at tbl.2, available
at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2008/may/table2.asp (reporting 4,933 full-time-equivalent posi-
tions at the Smithsonian).
253. Stuart M. Butler et al., Crisis Facing HCFA & Millions of Americans, 18 HEALTH AFF. 8, 8
(1999).
254. See Paul Krugman, Messing with Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/25/opinion/25krugman.html.
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Assuring the legitimacy of private actors that have a financial incentive to
stint on medical care would require a dramatic bureaucratic reorientation and
reinvigoration. As Mark Hall has pointed out, the rise of managed care threat-
ened to undermine the very trust that forms the basis of the physician-patient
255-relationship. Paying organized systems in bundles will precipitate similar
threats to trust, which could in turn impede the development of organized
systems of care. Two years ago, for one example, Medicare started to bundle
payments to dialysis centers to cover the costs of both their treatments and
drugs. Almost immediately, this prompted concern that dialysis centers had cut
back far too much on needed-but expensive-medications.25 6
In a more indirect way, Medicare's enervated bureaucratic structure has
already hindered the development of organized medical systems. Medicare is
good at prompt and (relatively) hassle-free payment, but neither CMS nor its
contractors has anything like the capacity to scrutinize the claims that are paid
out. Unsurprisingly, Medicare has spawned an enormous amount of fraud and
abuse, which has provoked Congress to prohibit-most significantly, in the
antikickback statute and self-referral legislation 2 57-a bewildering array of
financial relationships between providers that, in Congress's view, distort treat-
ment decisions and encourage overtreatment. In proscribing financial arrange-
ments that more closely integrating institutional providers and physicians,
however, Congress has also stunted the development of organized medical
systems. 2 5 8 The antikickback and self-referral legislation will have to be relaxed
or amended, and analogous state laws preempted, in order to facilitate the
needed integration.
Congress, however, has consistently declined to give CMS the resources it
would need to do its job well. Part of the reason is that it only takes a small
group of federal officials to carry out CMS's essential mission-overseeing the
prompt distribution of federal money. Providers and beneficiaries are both
basically happy with this arrangement, sapping political energy to adequately
fund the agency. Plus, as Bruce Vladeck, the former head of HCFA (now CMS)
puts it, "everybody hates HCFA."2 5 9 The bureaucracy is perceived as sclerotic,
unresponsive, and inept. There's some irony here: Congress broke CMS and
now won't fund it because it's broken. But the situation is not unusual. Because
255. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 473 (2002).
256. See Kevin Sack, Unintended Consequence for Dialysis Patients as Drug Rule Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/health/policy/dialysis-rule-changes-followed-
by-transfusion-increases.html.
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006) (antikickback statute); id. § 1395nn (self-referral legislation).
258. See Mark A. Hall, Making Sense of Referral Fee Statutes, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL Y & L. 623,
624 (1988) (noting that the antikickback statute "has been threatening both to conventional practices
and to innovative business arrangements").
259. Interview by Edward Berkowitz with Bruce Vladeck, Adm'r, Health Care Fin. Admin., in
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 7, 2002), in CNTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVs., ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 178,
available at http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/downloads/cmsoralhistory.
pdf; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNING OFHCE, supra note 151, at 2; Iglehart, supra note 245, at w688.
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Congress routinely underestimates the managerial challenges posed by third-
party governance, 2 6 0 and federal agencies that oversee public-private networks
often have small budgets, inadequate personnel, and insufficient legal flexibility.
Government agencies are then lambasted for problems they were never equipped
to handle.26 1
There is thus every reason to think that Congress will resist allocating
sufficient resources to allow for effective oversight. But centering Medicare
around organized medical systems would at least reduce the funding problem to
more manageable dimensions. No longer would hundreds of thousands of
separate physicians and hospitals submit 1.2 billion claims for payment each
year. Instead, a more discrete set of organizations would submit a far smaller
number of claims for bundled (or capitated) payment. To borrow a concept from
James Scott, organized systems are much more "legible" to centralized authori-
ties than a vast army of private physicians, and they are more readily amenable
to oversight.2 62
Putting organized systems at the center of Medicare could also free up
additional resources by reducing or eliminating the need for fiscal intermediar-
ies and carriers. That would be a welcome change. As GAO reported in 1999,
inadequate oversight of Medicare's contractors has spawned "[m]any of the
financial weaknesses in Medicare." 2 63 Although high-profile scandals involving
those contractors264 have prompted some stabs at reform265-1n 2003, the
functions of fiscal intermediaries and carriers were collapsed and turned over to
Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) 2 6 6 -it's difficult to defend contin-
ued reliance on private insurers to process Medicare claims. The federal govern-
ment's oversight of a distributed network of private physicians and hospitals is
hard enough without inserting another layer of private contractors between
them.
A more ingenious and comprehensive solution to CMS's resource constraints
may be available, however. When a 1999 bipartisan commission called for
260. See Kettl, supra note 63, at 491 (observing that Congress "assume[s] that the management of
government services through indirect mechanisms will happen spontaneously and with little need for
government oversight").
261. See MORGAN & CAMPBELL supra note 20, at 15 (noting that "various program failures arise that
are frequently blamed on government officials who have never been sufficiently empowered to deal
with these problems").
262. See JAMEs C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES To IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CoNDmoN HAVE FAILED 11 (1998) ("Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of
vision. . . . [That] makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence
more susceptible to careful measurement and calculation.").
263. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-99-58, HCFA MANAGEMENT: AGENCY FACES MUL-
TIPLE CHALLENGES IN MANAGING ITS TRANSITION TO THE 21sT CENTURY 10 (1999).
264. See Robert Pear, Fraud in Medicare Increasingly Tied to Claims Payers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/20/us/fraud-in-medicare-increasingly-tied-to-claims-payers.
html.
265. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, sec. 911(a), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378 (2003).
266. See id. sec. 911(a), § 1874A(B)(1).
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transforming Medicare into a premium-support program-one in which private
insurers would compete for beneficiaries and receive capitated payments for
covering their care-the commission recommended the creation of an indepen-
dent Medicare Board to vet the private insurers, contract with qualified plans,
and enforce financial and quality standards.2 67 Critically, the 1999 proposal
would have given the new board power to levy assessments on participating
plans to cover its expenses, obviating the need to go hat in hand to Congress for
meager appropriations. 2 68 This self-financing model, typical for the banking
agencies, would have given the agency access to the resources necessary to
ensure that private plans were neither gaming the system nor stinting on care.
The same approach could be adapted for an agency that distributes large
bundled payments to organized health-care systems. This by itself would not
assure administrative success. The agency's staff would still have had to master
an unfamiliar skill set emphasizing quality monitoring, financial auditing, and
negotiation. 2 69 But a self-financing approach would at least take seriously the
imperative of creating a functional bureaucracy to manage the third-party
organizations that will have to bear primary responsibility, if anyone is to be
held responsible, for shaping the behavior of Medicare's bedside bureaucrats.
IV. MEDICARE REFORM AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Now enters the Affordable Care Act. Although the Act's principal goal is to
provide for near-universal coverage, it also aims to reshape the health-care
delivery system in an effort to reduce costs and improve quality. Medicare is the
ACA's most important policy lever for reform; the hope is that Medicare reform
will drive private reform.2 7 0 As I will show, however, the ACA reforms are
inattentive to the structural features of Medicare that have frustrated the develop-
ment of organized systems of care that have the incentives, bureaucratic where-
withal, and legitimacy to reshape physician practice patterns to accommodate
federal priorities. As a result, the ACA's reforms will likely disappoint.
A. INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD
In its most controversial effort to rein in Medicare cost inflation, the ACA
created a new agency known as the Independent Payment Advisory Board
267. See NAT'L BIPARTisAN CO1V'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, BULDING A BETTER MEDICARE FOR
TODAY AND TOmoRROw (1999), available at http://rs9.loc.gov/medicare/bbmtt3l599.html.
268. See Medicare Preservation and Improvement Act of 1999, S. 1895, 106th Cong. § 2246(b)
(1999).
269. See Super, supra note 17, at 423 ("Quite different interpersonal skills, such as negotiating
prowess, are necessary to be an effective contract officer.").
270. See David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend the Cost Curve, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1131,
1133 (2010) (observing that the "philosophy of the new health reform law ... is to use the leverage of
Medicare payments to change provider incentives throughout the medical system and thus encourage
more efficient care").
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(IPAB). 2 7 1 Comprising of fifteen health-care experts appointed by the President
who are removable only for cause, the Board's authority is nothing short of
remarkable. Starting in 2015, the Board must submit to the President and
Congress annual "proposals" for cutting Medicare if spending over a five-year
period increases faster than preselected targets linked to economy-wide inflation
(through 2019) and economic growth (for 2020 and after).27 2 IPAB proposals
are subject to few constraints: they cannot ration care, modify Medicare eligibil-
ity, or increase beneficiary cost sharing.273
Eight months after the Board issues a proposal, the Secretary of HHS must
implement it-wholesale and without amendment-unless Congress has en-
acted (and the President has signed) legislation making different, but equally
deep, cuts. 2 7 4 The proposal goes into effect "[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law," 2 7 5 meaning that Board proposals can override even preexisting
congressional statutes with which they conflict. Judicial review of an IPAB
proposal or its implementation is prohibited.276
The Board's insulation from political influence is both its principal virtue and
its biggest vice. To its proponents, the Board's insulation allows it to bring
policy expertise to bear on how most effectively to hold down rising Medicare
costs. 2 7 7 To its detractors, the Board is an antidemocratic abdication of congres-
sional authority to unaccountable green-eyeshade types. 2 7 8 (For the time being,
the detractors have the upper hand: Republican senators have threatened to
block any IPAB nominees and the Obama Administration has so far nominated
no one.) 2 7 9 Either way, the Board is generally recognized as one of the most
significant of the cost-reduction measures embedded in the ACA. 2 8 0 It is also
the most controversial.2 8 1
How does IPAB stack up as Medicare reform? Not well. As Timothy Jost has
rightly pointed out, IPAB's statutory imperative to cut spending to hit pre-
271. See ACA, sec. 3403, § 1899A, amended by Reconciliation Act, § 10320.
272. See id. sec. 3403, §§ 1899A(c)(2)(A)(i), 1899A(c)(3)(A)(i), modified by Reconciliation Act,
§ 10320(a)(1)(D)(ii).
273. See id. sec. 3403, § 1899A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
274. See id. sec. 3403, § 1899A(e).
275. See id.
276. See id. sec. 3403, § 1899A(e)(5).
277. See Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 601, 603 (2010).
278. See Health Care Bureaucrats Elimination Act, S. 3653, 111th Cong (2010) (aiming to "remove
unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats from seniors' personal health decisions by repealing the Indepen-
dent Payment Advisory Board").
279. See Brian Beutler, GOP Sens Threaten To Block Key Element of Health Care Law-and They
Can, TALKING PoINwrs MEMO (May 24, 2011), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/republicans-
threaten-to-squash-democrats-most-promising-debt-reduction-tool.php.
280. See Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 277 (extolling the Board).
281. Transcript of the First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/03/us/politics/transcript-of-the-first-presidential-debate-in-denver.html (including Governor Rom-
ney criticizing President Obama for "put[ting] in place an unelected board that's going to tell people,
ultimately, what kind of treatments they can have").
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established targets will inevitably privilege measurable, short-term cuts over
long-term reform.28 2 As a result, the Board's primary source of leverage will
likely come from slashing reimbursement rates. Yet these cuts won't lead to
payment bundles, introduce considerations of cost-effectiveness into the pro-
gram, allow for greater discrimination among providers, or arm CMS with new
resources.
What's more, by instructing IPAB to make automatic cuts to enforce spend-
ing targets, the ACA has established something like a sustainable growth rate
for the entire Medicare program. The Board may turn out to work as poorly: if
reimbursement rates drop low enough, the risk of hospital closures and physi-
cian threats to exit the program may prompt Congress to overrule IPAB's
spending cuts just as it has overruled the SGR.
About the best that can be said about IPAB is that steadily mounting cuts to
Medicare could bring providers to the negotiating table. This has been a
consistent pattern in Medicare reform: legislative threats followed by negotia-
tion. The 1983 enactment of the prospective payment system for hospitals was
possible, for example, because hospitals preferred it to a raft of poorly con-
ceived cuts that Congress had adopted just the year before.28 3 By the same
token, IPAB proposals may put pressure on provider groups to accept Medicare
reforms that they might otherwise have successfully resisted.
B. CENTER ON MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION
The delegation to IPAB is not the only sweeping delegation in the ACA. In
order "to test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce pro-
gram expenditures ... while preserving or enhancing quality of care,"284 the
ACA established the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within CMS.
The Innovation Center has carte blanche to waive any Medicare rules-
including statutory requirements-to test payment and service delivery models
that might eliminate deficits or avoid unnecessary expenditures.2 85 Judicial
review of any of the Innovation Center's activities is altogether precluded.2 86
Startlingly, the Secretary of HHS is authorized to expand the implementation
of any model upon finding, in coordination with the Chief Actuary at CMS, that
an expansion would save money or improve quality, "including implementation
on a nationwide basis."2 87 On its face, the delegation is jaw dropping: in taking
a successful model and applying it nationwide, the Secretary could essentially
282. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Independent Medicare Advisory Board, 11 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L.
& ETHICS 21, 30 (2011) (arguing that "the necessity of making year-to-year cuts is likely to focus the
IPAB's attention on short-term payment cuts rather than on changes in program incentives").
283. See DAVID G. SmrrH, PAYING FOR MEDICARE 28-31 (1992).
284. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3021, § 1115A(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2010)).
285. See id. sec. 3021, § 1115A(d)(1).
286. See id. sec. 3021, § 1115A(d)(2).
287. See id. sec. 3021, § 1115A(c).
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reconstitute the Medicare program without regard to preexisting Medicare rules
and without congressional involvement. Yet even as the delegation of authority
to IPAB has occasioned severe criticism, the Innovation Center's sweeping
authority has passed almost unnoticed.2 88
But does the immense power of the Innovation Center portend a robust effort
to encourage the development of organized health-care systems? In a word, no.
CMS is instead likely to tread cautiously. An acute lack of resources at the
agency will preclude any aggressive effort to put organized health-care systems
at the center of Medicare. As Kerry Weems, a former head of CMS, has
explained, "[t]he agency feels very vulnerable, in many ways, . . . because the
agency wishes it could do more, but the resources aren't there."28 9 And the
Innovation Center can't will into existence a bureaucracy that could manage a
structural overhaul and usher fifty million beneficiaries into a new payment
model. It is almost inconceivable that a beleaguered, defensive agency that
struggles to carry out its core assignment-paying provider bills-would court
massive internal disruption in an ambitious attempt to reshape Medicare.
Furthermore, any desire that CMS (and, by extension, the sitting Administra-
tion) might have to advance an ambitious reform agenda through the Innovation
Center will be tempered by the practical imperative of assuring congressional
support. It's true, as Peter Orszag and Ezekiel Emanuel have noted, that CMS
can bypass Congress in rolling out new Medicare programs. 2 9 0 But the notion
that this grants CMS the authority to remake Medicare assumes that Congress
will acquiesce in whatever the agency happens to do. This assumption is not
well-founded. Congress cares deeply about Medicare and assiduously microman-
ages the program. Of particular relevance, it has repeatedly pulled the plug on
demonstration projects and pilot programs that it dislikes.2 91 CMS will assur-
edly look for some congressional imprimatur before using its newly granted
authority to undertake anything but the least controversial of projects.
As a result, the Innovation Center's authority is, as a practical matter, quite
circumscribed. Indeed, the Center has already exhibited an unfortunate degree
of caution in rolling out a feeble pilot program to explore bundled payments.29 2
Because the program is voluntary, health-care organizations will likely sign up
only if they believe they can secure more money through the pilot program than
through traditional Medicare. That means either that few providers will partici-
pate or that cost savings won't materialize. Perhaps the need to find willing
volunteers explains why the four payment models that the Center hopes to pilot
are so tepid. Three of the four don't offer true bundled payments: hospitals and
288. For an exception, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Real Constitutional Problem with the
Affordable Care Act, 36 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 501, 503-06 (2011).
289. Iglehart, supra note 245, at w688.
290. See Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 277, at 602-03.
291. See, e.g., Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1102(f), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (repealing
program designed to test competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage).
292. See ACA, § 3023 (requiring bundled payment pilot program).
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physicians are still paid separately for their services, and the only difference is
that they can split among themselves cost savings they generate for Medi-
care.2 9 3 Yet the uncertain prospect of splitting a modest reward sometime down
the line is unlikely to overcome physicians' and hospitals' immediate financial
incentives under traditional Medicare. Although the fourth model does involve
true bundled payments, those payments are keyed only to individual hospital
stays and don't cover postacute care (including readmissions) that is part and
parcel of many episodes of care.29 4
Given the likely timidity of the Innovation Center, the structural features of
Medicare that have plagued past reform efforts and stunted the development of
organized health-care systems are likely to remain entrenched for the foresee-
able future. It's difficult to resist the conclusion that the Innovation Center more
closely resembles an airy promise to do better in the future rather than a resolute
commitment to confront Medicare's structural failings now. 2 9 5
C. PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE
In what amounts to Congress's most concerted effort to forestall the rapid
diffusion of needlessly expensive medical technology, the ACA established and
funded the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI). 9 6 PCORI
isn't a government agency, but a private nonprofit group funded by the govern-
ment and subject to oversight from a Board of Governors selected mainly by the
Comptroller General.2 97 PCORI's charge is to conduct, sponsor, and promote
"comparative clinical effectiveness research"-research that assesses the rela-
tive health benefits of different medical procedures, typically measured with
reference to the number of quality-adjusted-life years (QALYs) saved.2 98
PCORI's role is solely informational. Although its research can guide govern-
ment or private coverage determinations, it binds no one-including Medi-
care.2 9 9 Indeed, to parry charges that PCORI was a rationing board, the ACA
limited what Medicare can do with PCORI-generated research.3 00 Specifically,
Medicare is forbidden from using such research unless it engages in an open,
public process; from relying "solely" on comparative-effectiveness research in
denying coverage for services; from using PCORI-generated evidence in a
manner that values the extension of the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally
293. See CTRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., BUNDLED
PAYMENTS FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT INIADvE (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/Medial
fact sheets.asp.
294. See id.
295. See Jonathan Oberlander, Throwing Darts: Americans' Elusive Search for Health Care Cost
Control, 36 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 477, 480-81 (2011) (reaching a similar conclusion).
296. ACA, sec. 6301, § 1181(b).
297. See id. sec. 6301, § 1181(b), (f).
298. See id. sec. 6301, § 1182(a), (e).
299. See id. sec. 6301(c), § 1181(j).
300. See Kavita Patel, Health Reform's Tortuous Route to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute, 29 HEALTH AF. 1777, 1778-79 (2010).
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ill individual at a lower rate than the extension of the life of someone who is
younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill; and from using QALYs as a
"threshold" to determine coverage.30 1
As a practical matter, none of the Medicare-specific prohibitions appear all
that constraining. Medicare already has an open process for issuing coverage
determinations. It rarely relies "solely" on any one factor to deny coverage, and
nothing prevents Medicare from assigning great weight to comparative-
effectiveness research. Invoking PCORI research is fair game so long as
Medicare assigns a single value to the extension of one year of life, whatever
the age, disability, or illness of the individual in question. And Medicare could
avoid using QALYs as "a threshold" to determine coverage by taking an
all-things-considered approach.
But although the provisions of the ACA establishing PCORI don't much limit
Medicare's authority, they don't enhance it either. Congress was quite explicit
that it did not intend to supersede or modify Medicare's obligation to cover all
302reasonable and necessary medical services. I1 other words, Medicare still
cannot make cost-conscious coverage determinations or even set the size of
bundled payments with reference to low-cost benchmarks-making it hard to
see how PCORI could meaningfully slow the adoption of expensive new
technologies of marginal medical value.
The best-case scenario for PCORI is that it could generate information that
private risk-bearing organizations-managed-care plans or integrated medical
groups-could use to encourage their affiliated physicians to favor cost-
effective treatments. But Medicare's programmatic structure still discourages
the development of these organizations. Indeed, given Medicare's continued
reliance on fee-for-service payment, PCORI could, perversely, draw physician
attention to those treatments that are no more effective than alternatives but that
are considerably more remunerative.3 03
D. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Most promisingly, the ACA launched a "shared savings program" under
which so-called accountable care organizations (ACOs) can, if they achieve
certain spending and quality benchmarks, share in any Medicare savings that
result.3" The ACO model draws on the insight that most patients receive care
from a relatively stable network of physicians and hospitals.30 5 Even if those
providers are not formally affiliated, the hope is that a thin institutional struc-
301. ACA, sec. 6301(c), § 1182(a)-(c), (e).
302. Id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(b)(1).
303. See Elhauge, supra note 112, at 1527 (observing that technology assessment could "exacer-
bate[] cost problems by encouraging the use of innovations that confer relatively small marginal
benefits at much higher cost").
304. ACA, sec. 3022, § 1899.
305. See Elliot S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital
Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFE. w44, w48-49 (2006).
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ture-the ACO-can nonetheless knit them together in a collaborative effort,
driven by the prospect of financial gain, to improve quality and decrease costs.
Designing the ACO program was largely left to CMS, which issued its final
ACO regulations in November 2011.306 Under the regulations, ACOs are en-
titled to share a fraction of any programmatic savings they achieve relative to a
benchmark of what they likely would have been paid under traditional Medi-
care. A proposed rule under which ACOs would have shared in losses if they
exceeded their benchmarks was mostly abandoned in the final regulation.30 7
The basic idea behind ACOs is sound: putting integrated medical groups at
the center of Medicare administration could introduce traditional bureaucratic
tools-monitoring, measuring, benchmarking, even disciplining-in a hierarchi-
cal setting to better align the practice patterns of frontline physicians with
Medicare's priorities. But the ACOs that CMS envisions do not appear well
positioned to actually change how physicians practice medicine.
First, ACO hospitals and ACO physicians will still be paid as they have been
before, the only caveat being that their ACO will distribute any shared savings.
There is no shift to bundled payments-none-meaning that the sharp divide
between Parts A and B, as well as the perverse incentives of the fee-for-service
system, will remain entrenched.3 08 Particularly given the limited downside risk
to which they're exposed, the temptation of shared savings is unlikely to push
physicians to change their practice patterns: why should any individual physi-
cian worry about marginal shared savings or losses when she can protect her
paycheck just by providing expensive and intensive care? Physicians remain
locked into the same sort of collective-action problem that made the SGR such
an ineffective cost-containment tool. Similarly, hospitals may have little finan-
cial incentive to reduce hospital care, even if doing so would save the ACO
money on the whole. The benefits of keeping admission rates high may out-
weigh potential shared savings.3 09
Second, although ACOs can pick and choose from among providers in
building a network, they have no authority to keep beneficiaries within that
network.3 10 Should an ACO's network prove too restrictive, beneficiaries can
simply seek care elsewhere. This will blunt ACOs' ability to ensure that
306. See 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011).
307. For a terse rundown, see Donald M. Berwick, Making Good on ACOs' Promise-The Final
Rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1754 (2011).
308. See Harris Meyer, Now Departed from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Berwick Receives High Marks for His Tenure at Agency, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2277, 2284 (2011) (reporting
the view of major health systems that "they couldn't afford to provide more efficient, coordinated
services under an ACO model when they were still being paid primarily under a fee-for-service system
that rewards greater volume and intensity of services").
309. See Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, the
Concept is Too Vitally Important to Fail, 30 HEALTH AF. 1250, 1253 (2011) ("Many hospital administra-
tors, including those considering forming an accountable care organization, are concerned that im-
proved care management will result in unfilled beds and a decline in revenue.").
310. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67851 (stating that assignment to an ACO "in no way implies any limits,
restrictions, or diminishment of the rights of Medicare [fee-for-service] beneficiaries to exercise
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beneficiaries receive care from physicians who practice cost-conscious, high-
quality care.
Third, Medicare contractors still play a central role in collecting and dispens-
ing claims information for ACOs. Yet they introduce a delay in providing to
ACOs the data they need to reform their approach to health-care delivery.3 11
Compounding the problem are proposed CMS rules governing how beneficia-
ries will be assigned to ACOs. Providers favor prospective assignment so that
they know in advance which individuals they are responsible for. CMS, how-
ever, has endorsed a complex formula for retrospective assignment of beneficia-
ries.312 Before ACOs can use the claims data, CMS will have to inform them
which beneficiaries should count-introducing further delays. ACOs can't eas-
ily lean on participating physicians to change their practice patterns if they only
learn of problems two years (or more) down the line.
In short, the ACO program is much too mild. Past experience with this sort of
half-hearted model is not encouraging. An important CMS initiative that ran
from 2005 to 2010, the Physician Group Practice Demonstration, was designed
to assess whether ten integrated group practices could, if given bonuses for
hitting certain quality and efficiency benchmarks, save money while improving
quality. As Gail Wilensky notes, the results were "sobering."3 13 Few groups
realized any cost savings, and the cost savings that did materialize were not
substantial.3 14 Somewhat more encouragingly, almost all the groups did well on
the measured quality indicators. But it's hard to know if this reflected broad
improvement or just a narrow focus on the particular quality measures.3 15
In any event, why expect a weak voluntary program that leaves Medicare's
structure almost entirely intact to usher in a new era in which integrated medical
organizations push their physicians to attend to resource constraints and quality
improvement? The ACO program doesn't demand robust integration and it
doesn't aggressively foster such integration by offering capitated or bundled
payments. Instead, it precludes ACOs from limiting the choices of beneficiaries
and it doesn't provide ACOs ready access to needed claims data.316 Although
complete freedom of choice in the physicians and other health care practitioners and suppliers from
whom they receive their services").
311. See Harris Meyer, Accountable Care Organization Prototypes: Winners and Losers?, 30
HEALTH AFF. 1227, 1230 (2011) (noting that "[a] big lag in Medicare claims data was a serious problem"
in an ACO-like demonstration project).
312. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67851.
313. Gail R. Wilensky, Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration-A Sobering
Reflection, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. PERSPECTIVES 1659, 1660 (2011).
314. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 293, at 4-6. Even for the groups that
did cut costs, it is unclear that the demonstration project had anything to do with the reduced
health-care spending. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PHYSICIAN GROUP
PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION 18 (2009).
315. See Wilensky, supra note 313.
316. See Robert A. Berenson, Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care Organizations: A
Bridge to Nowhere?, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 721, 725 (2010) (observing with dismay that the ACO
program "attempts to upset or dislocate no one").
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CMS has the legal authority to establish a more robust ACO program than it
has, the ACA contemplates that any such program would remain voluntary.3 17
Yet any redesigned ACO program that actually promised to revolutionize care
delivery and slash Medicare expenditures would thin the ranks of potential
volunteers. That partly explains why the program that CMS has devised is so
uninspiring and why it will probably remain uninspiring going forward.
As it stands, the enthusiasm for ACOs is reminiscent of past enthusiasms for
peer review organizations, the prospective payment system, and Medicare
Advantage. Each time, inattentiveness to the incentives and capacities of third-
party actors to adjust the practice patterns of Medicare's physicians meant that
these reforms failed to live up to their promise. The embrace of ACOs is
characterized by the same sort of inattentiveness. The ACO concept may be
"too vitally important to fail," as Francis Crosson recently put it.318 But so too
were past efforts to fix Medicare-and they did fail.
CONCLUSION
Medicare reform is inevitable. The shape it takes is not. But whatever
hard-fought changes are made, the success of any particular reform will depend
fundamentally on whether it addresses the panoply of structural obstacles that
have discouraged the development of health-care organizations with the incen-
tives, capacity, and legitimacy to align the practice patterns of Medicare's
physicians-its bedside bureaucrats-with federal priorities. We cannot afford
to remain inattentive to the ways that Congress, nearly fifty years ago, made
Medicare impossible to manage.
It appears, however, that we are at risk of precisely such inattention. In its
recent recommendations to the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction,
and again in its proposed 2013 budget, the Obama Administration recom-
mended no meaningful structural changes to Medicare, content instead to allow
the ACA's reforms to play out.31 9 The Administration has also distanced itself
from a report issued by a majority of the members of a bipartisan presidential
commission on fiscal responsibility chaired by Erskine Bowles and Alan Simp-
son. Even that report is much too mild: it recommends dramatic one-time cuts
in Medicare expenditures but offers not one concrete suggestion for structural
change.3 20 Only if Medicare outlays grow faster than one percent of GDP after
317. See ACA, sec. 3022, § 1899(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (defining "eligible" groups of providers to include
those "willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries assigned to it").
318. See Crosson, supra note 309, at 1250.
319. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIVING WITHIN OUR MEANS AND
INVESTING IN THE FUTURE: THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFICIT REDUCTION 35-40
(2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT 107-15 (2012).
320. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 37-39 (2011).
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2020-as they almost certainly will-does the report even "recommend" that
Congress consider "structural reforms."32 1
Those who self-consciously seek to transform Medicare likewise underesti-
mate the scope of the problem. Under the widely publicized plan proposed by
Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Paul Ryan, Medicare beneficiaries
would receive a premium-support credit that they could, on a health-insurance
exchange, use to buy coverage either from traditional Medicare or from a
private plan.3 22 Private plans would have to cover all the services that tradi-
tional Medicare covers. The amount of the credit would be pegged to the
premium costs of the second-least-expensive private plan in the exchange or to
traditional Medicare, whichever is cheaper.3 23 The idea is to put traditional
Medicare in competition with private insurers and let the market sort out which
beneficiaries prefer.
But the Wyden-Ryan plan does little more than augment Medicare Advan-
tage, where private plans are already in competition with traditional Medicare.
Establishing a Medicare exchange would be new, but that would just reorganize
the market, not revamp it. The only significant change from current law would
be that some beneficiaries could no longer enroll in traditional Medicare for the
cost of Part B premiums. Instead, if two or more private plans in a geographical
area were to offer a complete roster of benefits at a lower cost, beneficiaries in
that area would have to pay out of pocket to remain in traditional Medicare.
This would mitigate one important obstacle to Medicare Advantage's smooth
operation-namely, that beneficiaries who grow dissatisfied with constraints on
their care can, at little or no cost, flip back into traditional Medicare.
Otherwise, however, the Wyden-Ryan plan retains the flaws in Medicare
Advantage's design. Instead of proposing an invigoration of regulatory capacity
to oversee an enormous expansion of Medicare's managed-care program, the
plan blandly anticipates that "CMS will retain the authority it currently pos-
324sesses" to oversee private insurers. More worrying, the plan assumes that the
insurance companies it enlists will have the capacity and legitimacy to change
how physicians practice medicine. Although some managed-care plans are
tightly affiliated with organized health-care systems-the Geisinger Health Sys-
tem and Sharp HealthCare, for example, both have Medicare Advantage
plans325-most operate at a distance from physicians, have no proven track
321. Id. at 42.
322. See RON WYDEN & PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES To STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH
SECURITY FOR ALL: BIPARTISAN OPTIONS FOR THE FuURE 7-11 (2011).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 2.
325. See Living Independently for Elders, GEISINGER, http://www.lifegeisinger.org (last visited Oct.
24, 2012); Medicare Plans, SHARP, http://www.sharp.com/seniors/medicare-plans.cfm (last visited Oct.
24, 2012).
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record at reducing costs or improving quality, and may be perceived as illegiti-
mate managers of health-care decisions. Stoking the development of private
insurers is a distant second best to fostering the creation of integrated health-care
systems.
The inattention to Medicare administration from both political camps is
worrisome. Whatever the particulars of the approach to Medicare reform,
Congress will have to assure that Medicare's private agents can influence the
behavior of physicians at the bedside. To do otherwise would be to slight other
valid demands on taxpayer dollars and consign Medicare beneficiaries to frag-
mented, low-quality care.
There is a loose analogy here to another massive and dysfunctional federal
program that once funneled taxpayer dollars to favored constituencies on the
say-so of private physicians: the pension program for disabled Civil War
veterans. Although qualifying for a pension depended on a variety of factors,
the most critical was usually an examining surgeon's report documenting
whether, and to what degree, a soldier was disabled.3 26 But examining surgeons
most of them private practitioners-proved quite solicitous to veterans' disabil-
ity claims. Then, as now, surgeons were paid on a fee-for-service basis-a fee
for every examination they made of a veteran, regardless of the outcome of that
examination. To attract veterans, surgeons cultivated reputations as generous
327examiners. The result was a program that lavished taxpayer dollars on
veterans, many with dubious disability claims.
In response, as Jerry Mashaw recounts, the federal government repeatedly
attempted over the later part of the nineteenth century to make the surgeons
more attentive to the concerns of the Pension Bureau than to those of the
claimants.3 28 When those efforts proved inadequate, and as the taxpayers foot-
ing the bill grew increasingly agitated, Congress-at the beginning of the
twentieth century-finally stopped paying doctors a fee for each examination.
Instead, Congress put its surgeons on a fixed government salary.329 Nicholas
Parrillo explains that "Congress thereby established a government capable of
saying 'No' to service recipients, in a way that acknowledged (if crudely) rival
mass claims to public resources."3 30
The challenge for Medicare is similar: how to create an administrative
structure that forces its army of physicians to account for competing demands
on taxpayer dollars. But the nation's physicians can't be made into federal
326. See Mashaw, supra note 13, at 1428.
327. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MoTIvE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GovERNMENT, 1780-1940, ch. 4 (forthcoming 2013).
328. See Mashaw, supra note 13, at 1432.
329. See PARRILLO, supra note 327, at intro.
330. Id.
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employees. Instead, Medicare will have to be refashioned around private organi-
zations with the incentives and leverage to shape physician practice patterns in a
cost-conscious and clinically sensitive manner. The shift will inevitably alienate
some Medicare beneficiaries and physicians, and political resistance will be
intense, perhaps insuperable. But only by restructuring Medicare can the pro-
gram remain vital well into the twenty-first century.
